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It is generally understood that the way to discourage particular
behavior in individuals is to punish that behavior, on the theory that
rational individuals seek to avoid punishment. Laws aimed at deterring
behavior operate on the assumption that increasing the likelihood of
punishment, the severity of punishment, or both, will decrease the
behavior. The success of these laws is evaluated by how much the targeted
behavior decreases. The law of preferential transfers- which punishes
creditors who have been paid prior to a bankruptcy filing at the expense of
other, unpaid creditors - has been defended on the grounds that it deters a
race to collect from a struggling debtor. However, deterrence theory
suggests that the low likelihood of punishment and the cap on punishment
associated with preference law make it a very poor deterrence. Further,
empirical evidence drawn from interviews with affected creditors, debtors,
and attorneys demonstrates that in practice preference law does little or
nothing to deter targeted behavior and, in the process, imposes significant
costs. The weaknesses of preference law call for its significant revision, to
place a greater focus on specific categories of creditors to be punished on
account of their pre-bankruptcy activities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Laws that are internally inconsistent in their purpose, their
application, and their consequences are inevitably (and accurately)
perceived to be unfair by those whom they regulate. So it is with
the law of preferential transfers in bankruptcy, which can
560
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negatively affect those who have done business with a debtor and
find themselves involved in bankruptcy proceedings as a con-
sequence of the debtor's bankruptcy petition. In any given year,
thousands of creditors who have been paid on account of
outstanding debts owed by the debtor, or who have otherwise
improved their position vis-A-vis the debtor in the ninety days prior
to the debtor's bankruptcy petition, are subject to laws mandating
the return of those funds to the bankruptcy estate. Although this
result is always unpleasant and unwelcome for the liable creditors,
it has been justified on two general grounds. First, the mandate of
equality in bankruptcy suggests that all unsecured creditors,
including those who might have been paid in the ninety-day run
up to bankruptcy, should share equally in the pain of discharge by
participating in a pro rata distribution of the debtor's available
assets.1 Second, creditors should be deterred from attempting to
recover from debtors who are insolvent, thereby hastening the
decline into bankruptcy and causing a loss of the debtor's value as
a going concern. Under this second rationale, some transfers,
particularly those that reflect ongoing business transactions with
the debtor, should be protected from preference law, even if doing
so undermines the first rationale of equality.
These two explanations for preference law are internally
inconsistent, as the first supports the return of all preferential
transfers, while the second would differentiate between "good"
and "bad" transfers. I have argued elsewhere that, at least in the
context of business bankruptcies, Chapter 7 liquidation and
Chapter 11 reorganization should be treated differently for
purposes of preference law. Preference law should be enforced
more stringently in Chapter 7 liquidation to better serve the goal of
equal distribution, and abandoned in Chapter 11 reorganizations,
where equal distribution is much less emphasized. 2 I have argued
1. Secured creditors generally have their rights to repayment and satisfaction
through collateral preserved in bankruptcy, with some exceptions. See Lawrence
Ponoroff, Reclaim This! Getting Credit Seller Rights in Bankruptcy Right, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 733,
750-52 (2014).
2. See Brook E. Gotberg, Conflicting Preferences in Business Bankruptcy: The Need for
Different Rules in Different Chapters, 100 IOWA L. REV. 51, 59 (2014). This effort to distinguish
between bankruptcy chapters has received criticism both from those who argue that it goes
too far, see Lawrence Ponoroff, Bankruptcy Preferences: Recalcitrant Passengers Aboard the Flight
that preference law is about equality: exceptions to the law
purporting to protect "good" transfers undermine efforts to obtain
such equality by imposing unnecessary costs on the system.3 Here,
I respond to critics who have asserted that preference law remains
essential to deterring undesirable creditor behavior in the days
leading up to bankruptcy.
As an initial matter, the concept that law successfully shapes
behavior through the principle of deterrence is problematic because
deterrence assumes that actors will act rationally, and we know that
most will not, at least not all the time.4 Further, it is unclear that the
behavior targeted by preference law is actually problematic enough
to be discouraged. Why not allow creditors to collect on their debts,
particularly when doing so is in those creditors' own self-interest
and entirely legal at the time of collection? Notwithstanding these
criticisms, and assuming both that deterrence can actually work
and is a worthy goal, I nevertheless conclude that if preference law
as currently written fails to truly achieve equal distribution, it is a
much bigger failure in deterring bad creditor behavior.
Preference law is flawed as a deterrent for two reasons. First, it
is not at all clear what behavior it attempts to discourage. Indeed,
different versions of the law have appeared to target dramatically
different behaviors over time, and commentators are divided as to
the population of creditors or the types of behavior that should be
targeted. Second, the law is not an effective deterrence to any
population or debt collection efforts. The maximum penalty of a
preference is the return of the amount recovered, with most cases
settling for a much lower amount. The likelihood of being caught
by preference law is also highly uncertain; in fact, most creditors
who seek to recover from struggling debtors will never be subject
to preference avoidance.
from Creditor Equality, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 329, 384 (2016) ("[Tihe call for total elimination of
preferences in reorganization cases is much like killing the patient in order to halt the spread
of the disease."), and those who argue it does not go far enough, see David A. Skeel, Jr., The
Empty Idea of "Equality of Creditors," 166 U. PA. L. REv. 699, 729 (2018) (arguing that the
equality of creditors norm has largely faded from bankruptcy, and that preference law
should reflect this trend by transitioning to a more limited law targeting self-dealing
behavior). Such criticisms raise valid concerns regarding complications regarding
conversion of a case from one chapter to another; unfortunately there is not space to address
these concerns in this Article.
3. See Gotberg, supra note 2.
4. Owen D. Jones, The Evolution of Irrationality, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 289, 314-15 (2001).
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As a consequence of these flaws, preference law is rightly
viewed as capricious and ineffective. Further, preference law
disproportionately imposes its costs on less sophisticated or less
aware creditors, frequently smaller businesses who have naively
accepted payments from a debtor without any appreciation for
their potential future liability. These creditors are typically not
familiar with preference law and cannot be deterred by a law of
which they are unaware. Better-informed creditors who are
familiar with preference law are typically also familiar with its
exceptions, and more likely to structure their transactions to fall
within an exception. Well-advised creditors can also position
themselves to challenge a claim of preference liability should it
arise, dramatically reducing their ultimate liability. To the extent
informed creditors change their behavior in response to preference
law, it is not in a way that benefits debtors; that is, rather than
affording debtors additional breathing space in times of financial
distress, they reduce the credit they offer to all debtors or insist that
such credit be secured.5 Due to the inherent caps on preference
liability, even creditors who fail to raise any colorable defense to
preference litigation and are found liable are usually better off
having attempted to collect a preference than not.
These criticisms of preference law are established and
demonstrated below 6 both by a rational cost-benefit analysis of
preference collection, drawing upon prior literature regarding
deterrence in the law, and from empirical field work. This Article is
the first of its kind to argue that preference law is ineffective as a
deterrent of collection behavior based on empirical evidence,
drawn from interviews of actors within the field-debtors,
creditors, and the attorneys who represented them in bankruptcy
proceedings. This Article reports on interviews of sampled
5. For more on how preference law impacts business relationships between debtors
and creditors, see Brook E. Gotberg, It Cuts Both Ways: How Preference Avoidance Actions Can
Harm Business Relationships Between Debtors and Creditors 1 (Univ. Mo. Sch. Law Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 2018-28, 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract
=3224683.
6. For a discussion of the rational cost-benefit analysis, see infra Section ILA, and for
the empirical findings, see infra Section V.D.
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individuals who participated in successful 7 Chapter 11 reorgani-
zation cases involving preference actions. The overwhelming and
indisputable conclusion from these interviews is that creditors may
adjust their behavior in response to preference law, but not in ways
that further the purported goal of preference deterrence. Accord-
ingly, if preference law is a law of deterrence, it is wholly ineffectual
in its purpose.
From this point forth, this Article assumes that preference law
is not aimed at equality among creditors8 but rather at deterrence.9
Assuming both that deterrence can work and that we should have
laws deterring collection,10 preference law would need to be
substantially altered to successfully deter. Rather than a blanket
imposition of liability on all creditors who have received payments
within the ninety days before bankruptcy, liability should be
limited to insiders, select secured creditors, and judgment lien
creditors. Rather than demanding mere repayment of the prefer-
ence received, the law should introduce a meaningful penalty to
discourage these creditors from acting to undermine a debtor's
potential for reorganization in the days prior to bankruptcy.
Stereotypical unsecured creditors do not have the power to
negatively impact a debtor's chances of reorganization in a
meaningful way, and so should not be targets of the law for the sake
of deterrence. Further, the current scheme does not deter them from
attempting to recover whatever they can in the days prior to bank-
ruptcy. Accordingly, for purposes of deterrence the law should
cease to apply to such creditors.
The Article will proceed as follows. Part II clarifies what it
means for a law to act as a deterrent, demonstrating how deterrence
works in criminal and in civil proceedings, and provides a brief
7. As in many analyses of Chapter 11 cases, success here is defined as obtaining a
confirmed plan in Chapter 11. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success
of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics, 107 MiiCH. L. REv. 603, 610-12 (2009).
8. Equality of distribution has long been considered the central goal of bankruptcy,
although its primacy has recently come under attack. See Skeel, supra note 2.
9. I do not advocate this position but rather stand by the perspective I outlined in
Gotberg, supra note 2. This Article is intended largely to demonstrate the flaws inherent in
treating preference law as a law of deterrence, rather than equality. Insofar as the law
continues to satisfy both goals, the recommendations found herein are inconsistent with the
goal of equality.
10. I make these assumptions purely for the sake of argument. I have reservations
regarding the first assumption and am wholly unpersuaded of the second.
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summary of how the theory of deterrence has been criticized. Part
III explains preference law in the bankruptcy context and how it
can be said to deter creditors. Part IV demonstrates how preference
law fails to successfully identify targeted behavior. Part V uses a
cost-benefit model to demonstrate how preference law fails to
meaningfully deter, because the likelihood of liability is low and
the penalty associated with a preference is limited to the amount of
the original transfer. This Part is further supported by empirical
findings that reinforce the theoretical conclusions of the cost-benefit
model. Part VI proposes amendments to the preference laws that
would respond to these findings. It suggests ways in which the law
could more closely target specific behaviors, while largely
reserving judgment on whether such behaviors should be targeted
at all. Part VII concludes.
II. DETERRENCE
A. What Does It Mean to Deter?
A major tool of the law in shaping the behavior of its citizens is
discouraging certain behavior by penalizing it. The principle of
legal deterrence operates on the assumption that rational actors will
examine the costs and benefits of engaging in any given behavior.
If the costs imposed by the penalty outweigh the benefits of
engaging in the behavior, they will choose not to engage in it. The
law typically deters by increasing costs associated with certain
behavior through punishment such as incarceration or monetary
sanctions, although conceivably, the law could accomplish the
same effect by reducing the benefits of the targeted behavior.
Scholars often attempt to evaluate the deterrent effect of a given law
by tracking measurements of behavior before and after the law
comes into effect.
Although deterrent laws are deemed efficient or inefficient
depending on their success in reducing the undesirable behavior,
not all deterrents are judged on the same standard of success.
Behavior that is more despicable requires a less efficient deterrent
to justify the imposition of costs; for example, most would probably
agree that laws attempting to deter murder are justified, even if
they are relatively inefficient in preventing murders.11 On the other
hand, laws that are inefficient at preventing smaller infractions (for
example, turnstile jumping) may be less justifiable, as costs of
enforcement outweigh the benefits of deterrence. 12
Some may object generally to use of cost-benefit analysis as a
method of evaluating the benefits of a particular policy, in part
because they disagree with utilitarianism as an ultimate goal or
because such an analysis may be difficult to accomplish and
therefore prove unreliable.1 3 However, the concept of deterrence
inherently invites such an analysis, because it assumes that
individuals subject to the law adopt a utilitarian approach by which
they adjust their behavior. Laws that are justified on the grounds of
deterrence have accordingly wed themselves to a utilitarian
approach. Under this approach, laws that efficiently discourage the
targeted behavior are good and should be enacted and upheld, and
laws that do not efficiently discourage the targeted behavior are
bad and should be abandoned.
This approach is subject to challenge insofar as the analysis
relies on a theoretical calculation of efficiency rather than a real-
world application. The theory of deterrence necessarily assumes
that individuals who would be deterred by the punishment
associated with the law are rational actors who engage in a rational
analysis with all relevant facts. Obviously, insofar as these
assumptions are incorrect, the analysis is imperfect. Actors cannot
be deterred by laws of which they are unaware, and actors who do
11. The conversation regarding the death penalty as a deterrence is illustrative. See
John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty
Debate, 58 STAN. L. REv. 791, 792-94 (2005) (finding that evidence of deterrence is surprisingly
fragile); Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662,1666
(1986) ("Sparing the lives of even a few prospective victims by deterring their murderers is
more important than preserving the lives of convicted murderers because of the possibility,
or even the probability, that executing them would not deter others.").
12. See Maura Ewing, Will New York Stop Arresting People for Evading Subway Fares?,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/new
-york-subway-fares/535866/ (noting that Manhattan District Attorney Cy Vance recently
announced the office would stop prosecuting fare beating); Ryan Kailath, New York Won't
Arrest You for Stealing a Subway Ride Anymore, MARKETPLACE (Aug. 31, 2017, 5:47 AM),
https://www.marketplace.org/2017/08/31/economy/new-york-wont-arrest-you-stealing
-subway-ride-anymore (noting that New York City's Independent Budget Office estimated
that prosecuting fare evasion cost $2,458 per arrest not iicluding detention costs, while
allowing free subway access would cost only a tenth of that).
13. See generally Robert H. Frank, Mhy Is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 913 (2000) (addressing common objections to a cost-benefit analysis).
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not engage in a utilitarian analysis will not respond as anticipated
to a given law. Accordingly, laws which are poorly understood,
counterintuitive, or ignored by the public will prove more efficient
in theory than they are in practice. Any model that seeks to
accurately calculate the deterrent effect of a given law must factor
in the extent to which the law is incorporated into decision-
making processes.
Further, the baseline assumption of deterrence theory is that
individuals will operate rationally to maximize their own objective
benefit (the rational choice assumption). Even champions of the law
and economics approach have recognized that "[t]here is simply
too much credible experimental evidence that individuals frequent-
ly act in ways that are incompatible with the assumptions of
rational choice theory" for it to stand as a justification alone and
without modification.14 One of the purported benefits of the
rational choice theory is its simplicity; this simplicity also limits its
ability to predict behavior.15 Accordingly, an evaluation of a law's
deterrent effect, to be truly accurate, would need to take into
account both the theoretical estimation of the law's influence on
behavior and also evidence of actual responsive behavior.
For purposes of this Article, I assume that it is possible to
effectively deter behavior and that deterrence may generally be
predicted according to a cost-benefit analysis, incorporating a
rational choice assumption.16 I evaluate preference law accordingly.
I assume both that creditors act rationally, at least when engaging
14. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051,1055 (2000) (arguing for
a "law and behavioral science" approach that would seek to understand the incentive effects
of a law by drawing on psychological and sociocultural theories); see also David J. Arkush,
Situating Emotion: A Critical Realist View of Emotion and Nonconscious Cognitive Processes for
Law and Legal Theory, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1275 (2008) (arguing that emotion plays a role in most
if not all decisions and is not readily amenable to maximization); Korobkin, supra at 1058;
Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551,
1554 (1998) (recognizing that "cognitive quirks" such as "the availability heuristic,
overoptimism, the sunk-cost fallacy, loss aversion, and framing effects" will inform rational
choice, but arguing that the fact that people are not always rational is not in itself a challenge
to rational choice economics because it can be accounted for in models).
15. Robert H. Frank, Commitment Problems in the Theory of Rational Choice, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 1789, 1790 (2003) (arguing for an alternative to the standard of rationality, which
produces predictions that often turn out to be flatly incorrect).
16. I do not concede this point for at least two reasons. First, citizens are unlikely to be
aware of the laws which ostensibly deter their behavior, and second, rational choice
assumption is only marginally accurate in predicting behavior.
in business transactions giving rise to preference claims, and that
creditors are solely incentivized to maximize their overall wealth,
represented only in dollars. I therefore allow that a law which
exacts a dollar cost from individuals for a given action is likely to
discourage individuals from acting when the cost imposed by the
law exceeds the dollar benefit of that action. Nevertheless, I
conclude that preference law as written neither successfully
identifies the actions it wishes to discourage nor imposes a
sufficient cost to deter those actions. In support of this conclusion,
I first lay out the theoretical underpinnings of deterrence.
B. Becker's Theory of Deterrence
Gary S. Becker may justifiably be viewed as the father of the
economic model of deterrence. The principles underlying his
theory of criminal deterrence have been widely tested, both in and
out of the criminal law context. Becker's seminal paper examining
the costs and benefits of incarcerating criminals was first published
in 1968.17 In it, he suggested that the number of criminal offenses a
person will engage in depends on such variables as (1) the
probability of conviction, (2) the punishment if convicted, and (3) a
"portmanteau" of other influences such as personal willingness to
commit an illegal act, income available in legal and other illegal
activities, and the frequency of nuisance arrests. He represented
this thought by a simple equation:
Oi = Oi (pi, u),
with 0 representing the number of offenses, p the probability of
conviction per offensef the punishment per offense, and u all other
variables.18 He reasoned that increases in any variable (p, f, or u)
would tend to reduce the number of offenses, as the probable cost
for each offense would grow with the likelihood of apprehension
or cost of the penalty.19 Becker further argued that, in light of the
costs to society associated with the imprisonment of offenders,
17. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169 (1968).
18. Id. at 177.
19. Id.
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a better punishment would be to impose a series of fines when-
ever feasible. 20
Since Becker's publication, multiple authors have adopted and
tested this utility approach to criminal deterrence using empirical
data in a variety of contexts. 21 The associated formula has been
altered to better emphasize the cost/benefit nature of the analysis
as follows:
E (U) = (l-p) U(y) + p U(y-F),
where E(U) is the actor's expected utility from an action, p is the
likelihood of being punished, y is the anticipated returns from the
activity, and F is the anticipated penalty if the actor is punished. 22
Under this formula, an actor's likely utility (U) will be positive
whenever the returns from the activity exceed the punishment
associated with the activity, which is informed by how likely the
actor is to be caught and punished. As pointed out by Irving
Piliavin et al., an actor's decision whether to engage in the activity
will theoretically be informed by the expected rewards and costs as
subjectively perceived by the actor, rather than their objective
reality. 23 This approach acknowledges that actors will act based on
20. Id. at 193.
21. See, e.g., David S. Abrams, Estimating the Deterrent Effect of Incarceration Using
Sentencing Enhancements, 4 AM. ECON. J. 32 (2012) (finding lower crime rate in states with
enhanced punishments for committing crimes with a firearm); Gregory DeAngelo &
Benjamin Hansen, Life and Death in the Fast Lane: Police Enforcement and Traffic Fatalities, 6 AM.
ECON. J. 231 (2014) (finding that a decrease in enforcement via traffic citations is associated
with a significant increase in injuries and fatalities caused by traffic accidents); Francesco
Drago et al., The Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 117 J. POL.
ECON. 257 (2009) (finding in a study of Italian prisons that one month less time served in
prison in exchange for one month more in expected sentence for future crimes had a negative
impact on the probability of recidivism); Benjamin Hansen, Punishment and Deterrence:
Evidence from Drunk Driving, 105 AM. ECON. REv. 1581, 1608 (2015) (finding evidence that a
10 percent increase in sanctions and punishments is associated with a 2.3 percent decline in
drunk driving in the state of Washington); Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Does Three
Strikes Deter?: A Nonparametric Estimation, 42 J. HUM. RESOURCES 309 (2007) (finding lower
recidivism rates among convicts facing life in prison if convicted of a third strike in
California); David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, The Deterrence Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and
Evidence 1 (Princeton Univ., Dep't Econ., Ctr. Econ. Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 1168,
2009) (finding minimal response by youth to the large change in penalties for crimes when
they reach the age of eighteen).
22. Irving Piliavin et al., Crime, Deterrence, and Rational Choice, 51 AM. Soc. REV. 101,
101-02 (1986).
23. Id. at 102.
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what they believe, rather than what is true. However, it remains the
case that "[a] utility approach-like so much deterrence
theorizing -assumes rationality in the decision to commit a
crime."24 Assuming rationality in the criminal context may be a
fundamental error.
C. Broader Application
The rational choice assumption underpinning this deterrence
theory may be easier to defend in the civil context, where it has also
been applied. Concepts of deterrence arise frequently in discus-
sions of punitive damages, which may be awarded upon a finding
of liability in tort. Punitive damages are typically justified on one
or both of two grounds: first, that they may be necessary to achieve
fairness in punishing a wrongdoing, and second, that they deter
undesirable behavior.25 The first justification appeals to a sense of
moral desserts, and the second to an efficiency analysis. With re-
gards to the deterrence justification, punitive damages can only be
viewed as necessary to the extent that ordinary compensatory dam-
ages do not sufficiently discourage inappropriate behavior. 26 What
is more, because the possibility of punitive damages can increase
litigation costs, the use of punitive damages can only be defended
if the good to be obtained - deterrence - outweighs those costs. 27
In evaluating the efficiency of punitive damages as a means of
deterrence, Dorsey Ellis has concluded that in most instances
punitive damages are overkill because "[c]ompensatory damages
ordinarily would appear to be sufficient to promote efficient levels
of deterrence." 28 Indeed, some scholars, including Gary Schwartz,
have argued that a primary purpose of tort liability as a whole, with
its basic theory of damages, is to deter inappropriate behavior.29
24. Herbert Jacob, Rationality and Criminality, 59 Soc. SC. Q. 584, 584 (1978).
25. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 11 (1982) (distilling the purposes for punitive damages cited in judicial
opinions and writings of commentators into punishment and deterrence).
26. See Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive
Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 137 (1982) (noting that the primary purpose of
tort liability itself is to deter inappropriate behavior by accident causers).
27. See Ellis, supra note 25, at 46.
28. Id. at 9.
29. Schwartz, supra note 26, at 137; see also Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law:
Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEx. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (1997) (identifying
2018
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Schwartz cites Richard Posner, who has argued that the Learned
Hand formula of negligence represents an attempt to ensure
efficiency in accident prevention by encouraging potential tort-
feasors to engage in a cost-benefit analysis, whereby they would
prevent accidents when compensatory damages exceed the costs of
prevention, but not otherwise. 30 In other words, a tortfeasor should
endeavor to prevent torts when the cost of prevention does not
exceed the damages necessary to make a victim whole. On the other
hand, if the costs of prevention exceed compensatory damages,
tortfeasors should internalize those costs but not be required to
engage in prevention. In addition, to the extent that a victim would
be better placed to prevent harm (by taking due care) the tortfeasor
should not be liable for costs associated with the victim's own
negligence.31 Posner does note that greater punishment (imposing
of costs that exceed the victim's damages) may be "necessary where
the violator is frequently not apprehended, because a rational
lawbreaker will discount the gravity of any legal sanction by the
probability that it will be imposed." 32
Preference liability is not directly analogous to either punitive
damages or criminal behavior, but insofar as the law is intended to
deter behavior, it lends itself to similar theoretical evaluation. As
explained in greater depth below, actions giving rise to preference
liability are highly unlikely to be punished (or even punishable)
and the punishment typically meted out is significantly below the
benefit received, or at most, equal to it. In practice, enforcement of
preference law as a deterrence also raises additional concerns not
addressed in the classic Becker model of deterrence, such as
awareness of the law and the ability to weigh its likely conse-
quences in making a decision.
tort scholars as either in the camp of tort liability as an instrument of deterrence or as a way
of achieving corrective justice).
30. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972) ("Hand
was adumbrating, perhaps unwittingly, an economic meaning of negligence.").
31. Id. at39.
32. Id. at 41.
III. PREFERENCE LAW
A. Preference Liability and Defenses
As one attorney makes a point of explaining to his clients,
preference liability is a matter of timing, not of intent or
culpability. 33 Indeed, preference liability today34 has no explicit
intent requirement on either the part of the debtor (to prefer the
creditor over others) or the creditor (to come ahead of other
creditors in repayment).35 Rather, qualification of a given transfer
as "preferred" depends on whether it was (1) to or for the benefit
of a creditor; (2) on account of an antecedent debt; (3) made while
the debtor was insolvent; (4) during the preference period,
generally ninety days before the bankruptcy filing;36 and whether
it resulted (5) in the recipient receiving more than it would have
had the transfer not been made and the estate liquidated pursuant
to Chapter 7.37 Accordingly, otherwise entirely legal transactions
33. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 18, 2017) ("[I]t's got nothing to do with
whether or not you did something wrong or right. It's got everything to do with timing.").
Reference to statements by attorneys and creditors are drawn from interviews collected by
this author as part of a research study examining the impact of Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceedings on business relationships between debtors and creditors. This study involved a
total of 48 interviews from debtors, creditors, and their attorneys involved in a total of
fourteen confirmed Chapter 11 cases closed sometime between August 30, 2010, and
February 1, 2017, where preference actions had been filed against otherwise unsecured trade
creditors. All interview transcripts have been stripped of identifying material and are on file
with the author. See also discussion on Empirical Findings infra Section V.D.
34. The modern view of preference law as a law of strict liability was introduced in
1978 with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. Prior to that time, every version of Amer-
ican bankruptcy legislation included an element of intent. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Evil Inten-
tions and an Irresolute Endorsement for Scientific Rationalism: Bankruptcy Preferences One More
Time, 1993 WIs. L. REV. 1439, 1478 (1993) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Preferences One More Time].
35. See John C. McCoid, II, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of
Doubt, 67 VA. L. REV. 249, 259 (1981); see also In re Hall, 4 AM. BANKR. REP. ANN. 671, 678
(1900) (critiquing the statutory move away from the intent requirement); Robert Weisberg,
Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 3, 89-90 (1986) (discussing Referee Hotchkiss's critique of the system in In re Hall).
36. For insiders, the preference period is extended to one year before the bankruptcy
filing. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (2012).
37. See 11 U.S.C. § 547. Any transfer prior to the bankruptcy will satisfy the
requirement that the recipient be better off as a consequence when the creditor would have
received less than 100% in a Chapter 7 payout. See Savage & Assocs., P.C. v. Mandl (In re
Teligent Inc.), 380 B.R. 324, 339 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008); Vern Countryman, The Concept of a
Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713,736-37 (1985). The full text of § 547(b)
reads as follows:
2018BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Optimal Deterrence
between the debtor and creditor become subject to preference
avoidance based entirely on when they occurred. Put another way,
if the debtor transfers funds to a non-insider creditor on account of
a legitimate debt, and then files for bankruptcy ninety-one days
later, there are no legal ramifications. If the same transfer occurs
eighty-nine days before a bankruptcy filing, the creditor may be
liable to return the full amount to the bankruptcy estate. This law
applies to all creditors in every bankruptcy case, whether it be
consumer or commercial, reorganization or liquidation. Accord-
ingly, preference actions may be brought by a trustee in Chapter 7,
11, or 13,38 but also by the debtor itself in Chapter 11 acting as a
debtor-in-possession (DIP).39
Preference liability is subject to a variety of possible defenses, 40
which lack a comprehensive rationality and instead respond to a
myriad of legislative aims.41 The most hotly litigated defense to
(b) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (i) of this section, the trustee may
avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property -
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such
transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the tiling of the
petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if -
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided
by the provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
38. See id. §§ 704, 1106, 1302. A trustee appointed under Chapter 12, a less commonly
used chapter in the Bankruptcy Code, may also bring a preference claim. See id. § 1202.
39. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1984).
40. These exceptions to preference liability are listed in 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1)-(9) (2012).
Only some of the exceptions are discussed here.
41. Cf. C. Robert Morris, Bankrupt Fantasy: The Site of Missing Words and the Order of
Illusory Events, 45 ARK. L. REV. 265, 277 (1992) ("Preference law has always had difficulty
distinguishing between preferential transactions which should be avoided and those which
should be permitted to stand. In theory, transfers induced by the expectation or fear of an
imminent bankruptcy should be avoided; but transfers in the ordinary course or business
should stand, even though the debtor was insolvent and the creditor received more than it
would have in an ensuing bankruptcy.").
preference liability is the so-called "ordinary course" defense.42
Under this exception, no liability attaches when the incurrence of
the debt is made in the ordinary course of business and the pay-
ment of that debt is also made in the ordinary course of business or
according to ordinary business terms.43 The ordinary course excep-
tion, being highly subjective, encourages litigation by requiring the
interpretation of an impartial fact finder as to what is "ordinary."
This exception is frequently identified as support for the argument
that preference law is intended to deter, as the exception seems to
limit preference recovery to situations involving "non-ordinary" or
unusual collection efforts. 44 As explained below, this argument is
problematic, but the ordinary course exception nevertheless re-
mains the poster child for preference law as deterrence.
The next most commonly invoked exception for preference
defendants is the new value defense.45 This defense permits
creditors to avoid preference liability to the extent to which they
have transferred new value to the debtor subsequent to accepting
the preference. For example, suppose that on the eightieth day
before bankruptcy the debtor paid a creditor $10,000 on account of
a previous $20,000 balance. The creditor subsequently shipped an
42. Lawrence Ponoroff & Julie C. Ashby, Desperate Times and Desperate Measures: The
Troubled State of the Ordinary Course of Business Defense - and What to Do About It, 72 WASH. L.
REV. 5,7 n.3 (1997) ("The ordinary course of business exception is by far the most litigated of
the § 547(c) preference defenses and has been the source of keen interest to commentators.").
There is some suggestion in the mark-up minutes of the House subcommittee staff for the
original language of the exception, which contained the forty-five-day lookback limitation,
that it was also intended to set aside those payments for which debts were not truly
"antecedent," similar to the substantially contemporaneous exception. See Lissa Lamkin
Broome, Payments on Long-Term Debt as Voidable Preferences: The Impact of the 1984 Bankruptcy
Amendments, 1987 DUKE. L.J. 78, 98 n.97 (1987) (quoting Minutes of the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 553 (1977)
(statement of Mr. Kenneth Klee)). Subsequent amendments to the provision have removed
the possibility that it serves such a purpose. See discussion infra notes 63-65 and accompany-
ing text.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (2012). The statute required a showing that a transfer was both
made in the ordinary course of business and according to ordinary business terms until 2005,
when the and was replaced with "or." See Charles J. Tabb, The Brave New World of Bankruptcy
Preferences, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 425, 428 (2005) [hereinafter Brave New Word].
44. See A. Ani Afilalo, The Impact of Union Bank v. Wolas on the Ordinary Course of
Business Defense to a Trustee's Avoiding Powers, 72 B.U. L. REV. 625,635 (1992) (explaining that
the ordinary course of business exception is ultimately aimed at deterrence, not equality
of distribution).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (2012).
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additional $5,000 worth of goods to the debtor. Upon a bankruptcy
filing, the creditor would be liable for a preference of $10,000 but
would have a new value defense for the $5,000 of new value
subsequently transferred to the debtor. The new value defense only
applies to subsequent transfers to the debtor. In other words, had
the creditor given the debtor the $5,000 of goods prior to the $10,000
payment, there would be no defense. In theory, the defense is
available to those creditors who have continued to assist the debtor
by providing credit in the days leading up to bankruptcy.
Pursuant to the definition of a "transfer," preference liability
may attach to the grant of a security interest. In other words, a
creditor who signs a security agreement with the debtor within the
ninety days before bankruptcy to secure a pre-existing debt may be
subject to preference liability. However, purchase money security
interests are excepted from preference liability when perfected
within thirty days of the debtor receiving possession of the
collateral, 46 and statutory liens (such as mechanic's liens or other
security interests granted by operation of law) are also excepted
from preference liability.47 Smaller transfers may be excepted from
liability by way of a statutory minimum.48 For business cases, this
minimum -is around $6,000;49 for consumer cases it is around $600.
Amendments to the Code in 2005 establishing venue rules for
preference actions have also operated as a type of exception, by
virtue of discouraging preference actions against an out-of-state
creditor whose liability falls below a certain amount. In such cases,
the creditor may only be sued in its own venue, which may
discourage a trustee or DIP from bringing the claim by virtue of the
additional costs associated with prosecuting a case out of state.5 0
Although not a delineated exception to the rule, perhaps the
most common and relevant exception to preference liability is made
for wholly secured creditors. Any payments made to creditors
supported by a security interest in collateral that exceeds the value
of the debt will not be preferential transfers, because under
46. Id. § 547(c)(3).
47. Id. § 547(c)(6).
48. Id. § 547(c)(8)-(9).
49. Id.
50. See Brave New World, supra note 43, at 428. For more on the impact of venue
provisions, see infra note 114.
bankruptcy law such creditors are assured that they will receive the
full value of their claim. Accordingly, a secured creditor who
receives payments against the debt in the days before bankruptcy
would not receive any more than they would absent the transfer in
a case under Chapter 7. As a consequence, creditors with the most
leverage over the debtor and the best ability to force repayment are
not subject to preference liability. That said, creditors who attempt
to become secured just prior to bankruptcy may have that security
revoked, as explained above.51 Similarly, judgment creditors who
successfully execute a lien against the debtor's property within the
ninety days prior to a bankruptcy filing, but do not complete the
foreclosure process by the time of filing, may also be required to
give up their lien as a preferential transfer.52
Liability for preference may result in a court order and a
judgment against the creditor, although only a small percentage of
preference actions ever make it to trial. Although data is difficult to
gather on the subject, it is thought that a significant minority of
actions are settled before any court filings are made, and many
more are settled after the complaint is filed but before an answer is
due.53 The remainder are generally handled on summary judgment.
Creditors who refuse to settle a filed preference complaint or repay
pursuant to a court judgment will have any claim against the
debtor's estate disallowed, and accordingly will receive nothing in
the estate payout for sums they may still be owed by the debtor.54
B. Legislative Rationale for Preference Law as Deterrence
As a deterrent to collection on pre-existing debts, preference
law runs directly counter to non-bankruptcy law in terms of
51. See supra prior paragraph.
52. Whether or not the lien will be considered an avoidable preference will depend in
part upon the state law's determination of when the lien becomes perfected, and in part on
the Bankruptcy Code's statutory definition of a transfer. See, e.g., Redmond v. Mendenhall,
107 B.R. 318, 321-23 (D. Kan. 1989).
53. See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, AM. BANKR. INST., ABI PREFERENCE SURVEY REPORT 8
(1997) [hereinafter ABI PREFERENCE SURVEY].
54. 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (2012). In some cases, this appeared to be a deliberate strategy
for the debtor. See Telephone Interview with CA (Aug. 8, 2017) ("We never expected,
necessarily, to recover a whole bunch of money but just disallowing their claim because they
were the holder of an avoided transfer and didn't pay it.... [T]hat was a motivating factor
at times.").
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creditor incentives. Current state law legal regimes award creditors
who are first to collect and provide no minimum recovery for
slower creditors. In fact, the judicial system encourages creditors to
bring their claims within a reasonably prompt time period, or risk
losing their claims for repayment to the statute of limitations.55 If a
creditor is successful in collecting from the debtor, this leaves the
debtor with less cash, and a reduced ability to satisfy the claims of
others or to maintain ongoing operations. Accordingly, creditor
collection can prompt the need for a bankruptcy filing. The reason-
ing behind preference law is that if a creditor knows that successful
collection efforts may be undone in the bankruptcy proceedings,
the creditor will be less inclined to collect and more inclined to
wait.56 The debtor will benefit by virtue of this "breathing room"
and, if all goes well, may be able to overcome the difficulties that
lead to insolvency without the assistance of the bankruptcy court.
If this happens, all creditors benefit.
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code points to
Congressional perception that the race of creditors to collect should
be discouraged, at least in cases where bankruptcy is a possibility.
Preference law was expressly conscripted as the tool to deter such
a race.57 By specifically referencing a "rac[e] to the courthouse" in
discussion of preference law,58 the legislative history suggests that
Congress was primarily concerned with creditors attempting to
edge each other out by obtaining a judicial lien over the debtor's
property, or the functional equivalent, before other creditors could
do so. It is worth noting that typical unsecured creditors cannot
force a debtor to make a payment without invoking judicial
55. For example, the State of Missouri requires all actions upon contracts to be brought
within five years, Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.120 (2015), and South Carolina only permits such
actions to be brought within three years. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530 (2015).
56. See Ponoroff, supra note 2, at 344.
57. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 88 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5874 (the
general policy of preference law is deterring "unusual action" by the debtor or creditors);
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 177-78 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138 (" [Bly
permitting the trustee to avoid prebankruptcy transfers that occur within a short period
before bankruptcy, creditors are discouraged from racing to the courthouse to dismember
the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy."); H.R. Doc. NO. 93-137, at 202 (1973) ("First, it
lessens the possibility of a scramble among creditors for advantage; second, it promotes
equality; and third, it eliminates the incentive to make unwise loans in order to obtain a
preferential payment or security.").
58. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 177-78.
process, although creditors may vary in their ability to encourage
repayment based on other factors, such as the debtor's need for
ongoing creditor services or the need to maintain its reputation
with the creditor.5 9
From an insolvent debtor's perspective, it can be extra-
ordinarily harrying to manage the collection efforts of multiple
creditors at a time when the debtor lacks the ability to repay all of
its debts simultaneously. This activity can have a deleterious effect
on the debtor's ability to run its business. Further, there is the
concern that efforts to collect may prompt what might be described
as a "run on the bank," with all creditors losing confidence
simultaneously, obtaining judgments, seizing debtor assets, and
obliterating any possibility that the debtor can make good on its
claims to all.60 One of the motivating elements of the automatic stay
in bankruptcy is to prevent further collection efforts not only to
ensure that a given creditor cannot enrich itself at the expense of
others but also to provide the debtor with the breathing room
necessary to make an effectual comeback.61 Preference law, as a
deterrence, seeks to advance "the corresponding goal" of encour-
aging breathing room prior to the filing.62
59. An effort to seize the debtor's property without first obtaining a judgment lien or
garnishment order would constitute the tort of conversion and open the creditor to liability.
See Okyere v. Palisades Collection, LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 522, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("A
conversion takes place when someone, intentionally and without authority, assumes or
exercises control over personal property belonging to someone else, interfering with that
person's right of possession."); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law:
Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 1023 (2004) ("Under
nonbankruptcy law, unsecured creditors have no property interest in their debtor's assets
until such time as they receive a judicial lien, normally following judgment and, as to
personal property, the exercise of judicial remedies against the debtor's assets.").
60. See In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Unless the
favoring of particular creditors is outlawed, the mass of creditors of a shaky firm will be
nervous, fearing that one or a few of their number are going to walk away with all the firm's
assets....").
61. See In re Anderson, 913 F.2d 530, 533 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating courts should be
reticent to infringe on the breathing room afforded a debtor in Chapter 11 by Congress); see
generally H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5963, 6296-97.
62. Bankruptcy Preferences One More Timve, supra note 34, at 1479 ("The corresponding
goal of the preference law [is] deterring a frenzied pre-bankruptcy scramble to dismember
the debtor's estate .. "). It is worth noting that Professor Ponoroff further argued that this
goal was difficult to defend in light of the change in law removing any intent requirement,
and suggested that preference law was unlikely to have much of a deterrent effect. Id.
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Consistent with concerns over a race to collect through use of
the judicial process, rather than what might be considered the
ordinary amble of debt collection among creditors, Congress
enacted the ordinary course exception to protect "normal" debt
payments from liability, thereby more directly targeting "racing"
behavior. 63 Although what is "normal" is never fully defined, it
presumably would not include demands for payment of past-due
debts, whether or not such demands are accompanied by judicial
action.64 As originally passed, the ordinary course exception was
limited to the payment of a debt made in the ordinary course of
business within forty-five days of the debt's incurrence. 65 As stated
in the House and Senate Reports, "[tihe purpose of [the forty-five-
day ordinary course exception] is to leave undisturbed normal
financial relations, because it does not detract from the general
policy of the preference section [which is] to discourage unusual
action by either the debtor or his creditors during the debtor's slide
into bankruptcy."66 The forty-five-day language was later removed
from the exception in the 1984 amendments in response to
testimony that normal payment periods often exceeded forty-five
days.67 Following that change, the Supreme Court ruled in Union
Bank v. Wolas that interest payments on a seven-million-dollar loan
pursuant to a revolving credit agreement fell within the ordinary
course exception. 68 This ruling startled many who considered the
63. See Fiber Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc. (In re Molded Acoustical
Prods., Inc.), 18 F.3d 217, 224-25 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing O'Neill v. Nestle Libbys P.R., Inc., 729
F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 1984)) ("Bankruptcy policy, as evidenced by the very existence of
§ 547(c)(2), is to promote... continuing relationships on level terms, relationships which if
encouraged will often help businesses fend off an unwelcome voyage into the labyrinths of
a bankruptcy.").
64. But see Darrell Dunham & Donald Price, The End of Preference Liability for Unse-
cured Creditors: New Section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 60 IND. L.J. 487, 500 (1985) (sug-
gesting that the ordinary course exception could be interpreted to encompass all business-
related transactions).
65. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, tit. III, sec. 462(c), 98 Stat. 333, 378.
66. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 88 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,5874; H.R. REP.
No. 95-595, at 373 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6329; see also Broome, supra
note 42, at 98-99 (noting that the forty-five-day period appeared to be selected on the basis
of a one-month normal billing cycle).
67. See Broome, supra note 42, at 100-05 (describing complaints made to Congress on
behalf of trade creditors, commercial paper issuers, and consumer lenders).
68. Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151,162 (1991).
opinion a clear deviation from the intended scope of the
exception. 69 Under current law, therefore, preference liability is
nominally limited to those transfers that cannot be characterized as
falling within the ordinary course of business or having been made
according to ordinary business terms.
The ordinary course exception is a defense which must be
raised and supported by the defending creditor in a contest of
preference liability. There is no requirement on the part of the
trustee or the DIP to establish the lack of such a defense before
bringing the claim. Accordingly, even those creditors who fall with-
in the ordinary course exception are vulnerable to a claim by the
trustee and may thus be obligated to expend time and energy in
defending that claim, either to the trustee in settlement negotiations
or before the court in trial. The necessity of bringing an affirmative
defense is relevant in determining the deterrent power associated
with preference law, discussed in greater depth below.
There is some indication in the discussion of lawmakers that
deterrence is a secondary goal of preference law, with the primary
goal being equal distribution among creditors.70 Multiple scholars
have adopted this approach and criticized elements of preference
69. See Broome, supra note 42 at 121 (arguing that the legislative history of § 547(c)(2)
evinces that Congress intended the exception to be limited to payments to trade creditors,
not payments on long-term debt); Peter A. Davidson, ZZZZ Best - Ordinary Course Protection
for Long-Term Debt, 20 CAL. BANKR. J. 45, 45 (1992) ("The Court's decision, however, should
not come as a surprise to anyone who has paid heed to the Court's recent, strict
constructionist theme."); Debbi L. Rauanheimo, Case in Controversy- Section 547(c)(2)
Remains Uncertain After ZZZZ Best, 1 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 419, 419 (1992).
70. See H. REP. No. 95-595, at 177-78 ("The purpose of the preference section is two-
fold. First, by permitting the trustee to avoid prebankruptcy transfers that occur within a
short period before bankruptcy, creditors are discouraged from racing to the courthouse to
dismember the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy.... Second, and more important, the
preference provisions facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution
among creditors of the debtor."); Broome, supra note 42, at 115 (noting that, after 1978, the
main goal of preference law was to preserve equality of distribution, with deterrence only
an incidental objective); Countryman, supra note 37, at 748 ("The function of the preference
concept is to avoid prebankruptcy transfers that distort the bankruptcy policy of
distribution."); McCoid, supra note 35, at 260 ("Equal treatment of creditors is the oldest and
most frequently advanced goal of preference law."); Weisberg, supra note 35, at 4
("Bankruptcy law empowers the trustee and the court to enforce ratable distribution as a
matter of public power; preference law implies that the debtor and creditor have a private
duty to save the bankruptcy process from becoming moot before it has a chance to start.").
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law that undermine this notion of equality.71 I have previously
argued that preference law as an equalizing mechanism is unneces-
sarily hampered by exceptions that purport to deter undesirable
behavior. 72 Nonetheless, other scholars view deterrence as the
primary justification for preference law, or at least emphasize the
need for preference law to fulfill its role of deterrence, even if it
undercuts other goals.73 To these scholars, preference law has
[a] necessary and important role... in controlling express opt-out
behavior by in-the-know creditors... who.., shore up their
positions in derogation of the bankruptcy priority scheme by
obtaining or perfecting liens, seizing assets, pressuring the debtor
for transfers and payments, or otherwise accepting property from
the debtor in respect of claims on the eve of bankruptcy.74
These scholars see the exceptions to preference liability, parti-
cularly the ordinary course of business defense, as limiting the sting
of preference liability to those who collect as a response to the
perceived insolvency or pending failure of the debtor.75
71. See Broome, supra note 42, at 115 ("After Congress removed the 'reasonable cause
to believe' requirement in 1978, the main goal of the preference provision was to preserve
equality of distribution; the prevention of unusual pressure or action by the creditor became
only an incidental objective.") (quoting H. REP. No. 95-595, at 177-78); Ponoroff & Ashby,
supra note 42, at 19 (" [TIhe lack of improper ulterior motive in inducing or accepting payment
from a debtor is no longer a sufficient basis for allowing one creditor to achieve a better result
than its similarly placed counterparts."); Charles Jordan Tabb, Rethinking Preferences, 43 S.C.
L. REV. 981, 990 (1992) [hereinafter Rethinking Preferences] (submitting that it should be
irrelevant whether preferred creditors knowingly obtained payment from a debtor likely to
seek bankruptcy relief or not).
72. See Gotberg, supra note 2, at 59.
73. See, e.g., Daniel J. Bussel, The Problem with Preferences, 100 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 11, 15
(2014) (" [PIreference law has always emphasized controlling [knowing attempts to recover
ahead of other creditors] over forced disgorgement of innocently received preferences.").
74. Id. at 14-15.
75. See, e.g., Afilalo, supra note 44, at 635 (arguing that the ordinary course of business
exception extends protection to those who are not racing to the courthouse); Bussel, supra
note 73 ("The defenses to preference law are designed largely to protect innocent receipt of
preferences; they commonly do not apply to parties that can be shown to have deliberately
subverted ratable distribution on the eve of bankruptcy."). At least one author has argued
for greater protection for creditors and an expansion of defenses on these grounds. See
Michael J. Herbert, The Trustee Versus the Trade Creditor: A Critique of Section 547(c)(1), (2) &
(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 691-92 (1983) (arguing that trade creditors
who recognize a buyer's drift into bankruptcy but nonetheless continue to do business with
the debtor deserve significant protection from preference liability).
Although the primary purpose of this Article is not to challenge
the merit of congressional intent behind preference law as a
deterrence, a few points are worth raising in response to this goal,
if only in passing. First, the assumption that debtors are better off
struggling to repay debt outside bankruptcy, rather than inside
bankruptcy, is not clearly supported in practice. Debtors may be
better off in the long run and may more successfully reorganize
when they are pushed to file earlier (perhaps in response to
collection efforts) rather than later. Put another way, a marginally
insolvent company may be significantly easier to reorganize than a
significantly insolvent company. Second, Congress is not altogether
clear as to which "courthouse" it wishes to deter creditors from
visiting. The Bankruptcy Code does permit creditors to file an
involuntary petition to invoke bankruptcy proceedings against an
unwilling debtor.76 Creditors are encouraged by virtue of
preference law to use a bankruptcy filing (or threat of filing) to force
the clawback of payments the debtor may have made to other
creditors. 77 Finally, attempting to deter creditor collection for a
ninety-day period ignores the possible detrimental effect that
prolonged non-payment will have on those creditors, who
presumably have their own bills to pay in the meantime. Arguably,
it would be better for all involved if resolution of outstanding debts
were accomplished on a faster timeframe.
IV. THE GAP BETWEEN INTENDED AND ACTUAL TARGETS
Assuming, arguendo, that the goal of deterring opt-out behavior
from creditors who seek to "scramble... for advantage" is a
worthy one,78 and that creditors are rational actors who take
preference law into account in making decisions to collect on
debts,79 preference law is nevertheless fundamentally flawed as a
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2012).
77. See Interview with Paul Hoffmann (Feb. 9, 2018) ("When I represent creditors
dealing with debtors in financial distress, I routinely advise them to look for evidence of
preferential transfers because that is a sign that they should seriously consider filing an
involuntary case.") (notes in possession of author).
78. H.R. DoC. No. 93-137, at 202 (1973).
79. This is yet another questionable assumption, particularly for creditors unfamiliar
with preference law. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; E-mail from Paul Schrader,
Fullerton Law, to author (Mar. 26,2018,5:14 PM CST) (" [Tjhe idea of refusing payment when
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deterrent. The most obvious flaw is that preference liability utterly
fails to discriminate between creditors who are deliberately
attempting to "opt-out" of the bankruptcy distribution and
creditors who are totally ignorant of the debtor's financial stress.
One of the reasons creditors prove to be consistently resentful of
preference liability is that they cannot comprehend how they are
considered "preferred" when they have no close association with
the debtor and had no knowledge of the debtor's planned
bankruptcy filing. Such creditors frequently have significant
unsecured debt outstanding, despite the transfer, that will be
discharged in the bankruptcy. Preference law fails to exclusively
target bad actors; instead it affects any transferees who happen to
fall within the ninety-day window.8 0
A. Bad Actors
No doubt in large part because of the competing rationales for
preference law, the targets of preference liability have shifted over
the years. Early English preference law, as interpreted by Lord
Mansfield in Alderson v. Temple,S1 suggested that only fraudulent
collection efforts, or those undertaken "manifestly to defeat the
law" are "bad."82 In other words, voluntary efforts by the debtor to
favor certain creditors over others were the target, and transfers
made to creditors that demanded, sued, or threatened the debtor to
induce repayment they were legally entitled to were not subject to
preference law.83 Early preference law in the United States under
the 1841 Act also targeted transfers made by the debtor "in
contemplation of bankruptcy" and "for the purpose of giving any
a debtor wants to pay you is so detached from standard commercial practice that it just
cannot be conceived of as 'rational' by even the best-informed creditor.") (on file
with author).
80. This is deliberate in light of the overarching goal of equality. Scholars have argued
against attempts to distinguish between creditors based on their intentions in accepting a
preference, as the intention ultimately has no impact on the ultimate reduction of the estate.
See Rethinking Preferences, supra note 71, at 992 ("More than anything else, preference
theory needs to shake off this antiquated morality notion and embrace instead the
equality principle.").
81. Alderson v. Temple, 96 Eng. Rep. 384 (K.B. 1768).
82. Id. at 385.
83. Id.; 8 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 237 (2d
ed. 1937).
creditor... any preference or priority over the general creditors," 84
with liability hinging on the debtor's intent, rather than the
creditors'. The law changed in 1867 to include in its evaluation
whether or not a recipient creditor had reasonable cause to believe
the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer.8 5 By the 1898
Act, the American law had changed focus to look exclusively at
creditor intent, limiting liability to those cases in which "the person
receiving [the transfer] ... shall have had reasonable cause to
believe that it was intended thereby to give a preference." 86 Proven
ignorance of the debtor's financial situation was a defense to
preference liability.
The Bankruptcy Code, passed in 1978, ultimately eliminated
any requirement that the creditor be aware of a debtor's insolvency
or that the debtor intend to favor a particular creditor, establishing
preference as a matter of strict liability. 87 Many scholars view this
legislative move as evidence that preference law was not intended
and should not be used to distinguish between "innocent" and
"culpable" creditors, 88 and accordingly criticize mechanisms like
the ordinary course exception that do make distinctions between
creditors. 89  Others continue to advocate for exceptions to
preference liability on the justification that they protect creditors
who lack the intent or motivation to undermine the bankruptcy
84. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 2, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843). The law further
provided that one who granted a preference to a creditor would be denied discharge.
85. See 14 Stat. 517, ch. 176, § 35 (1867) repealed by 20 Stat. 99 (1878).
86. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 60(b), 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978); see also
Raymond T. Nimmer, Security Interests in Bankruptcy: An Overview of Section 547 of the Code,
17 Hous. L. REv. 289, 291 (1980) (discussing at length the requirements for preference liability
under the Bankruptcy Act).
87. See discussion supra note 33; see also REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 214-15 (1973).
"That [intent] requirement, more than any other, has rendered ineffective the preference
section of the present Act." Id. at 204.
88. Rethinking Preferences, supra note 71, at 992 ("More than anything else, preference
theory needs to shake off this antiquated morality notion and embrace instead the equal-
ity principle.").
89. See Countryman, supra note 37, at 775-76 (1985) (arguing that the ordinary course
exception should be repealed as it conflicts with preference policy); Rethinking Preferences,
supra note 71, at 1034 (proposing to repeal the ordinary course exception to increase the
certainty in and simplicity of preference lawsuits).
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distribution.90 Congress toyed with the idea of amending the
Bankruptcy Code shortly after its adoption to reinsert a "reasonable
cause to believe" requirement as an element of a preferential
transfer, presumably to protect creditors who were not aware of the
debtor's financial issues, but ultimately failed to do so.91
Scholars who do view contemporary preference law as a means
to deter bad creditor behavior disagree on precisely the type of
behavior that should be subject to deterrence. Accordingly, it is
difficult to parse out who are the bad actors- the individuals who
should be liable under preference law in order to deter their
bad acts. Instead, much of the discussion surrounding how
preference law and its exceptions should be drafted has stemmed
from opinions regarding who should not be subject to pref-
erence liability.
Lawrence Ponoroff and other prominent scholars have argued
that the ordinary course exception arose in large part to protect
"small, local suppliers of routine, open account credit."92 In other
words, preference law was not intended to affect "recurring,
customary credit transactions that would have taken place in the
ordinary course of the debtor's and creditor's businesses regardless
of whether the prospect of a bankruptcy filing was looming or
not."93 The goal was simply to prevent unusual or extreme
collection efforts.94 There is some suggestion that the ordinary
course exception was passed in particular to protect trade creditors,
defined loosely as creditors who do not function as lenders, but
rather extend credit by permitting delayed payment for goods and
services.95 For example, members of Congress proposed exceptions
90. See, e.g., Afilalo, supra note 44, at 635; see also Charles Jordan Tabb, Panglossian
Preference Paradigm? 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 407,412 (1997) ("The idea that only abnormal
prebankruptcy grabs should be avoidable, entrenched for several hundred years, apparently
is here to stay.").
91. See Broome, supra note 42, at 107.
92. Ponoroff & Ashby, supra note 42, at 16; see also Countryman, supra note 37, at 769
("If there was an intent to limit the [ordinary course] exception also to 'trade debt,' the
draftsmen must have despaired of attempting to define that frequently used but intensely
undefined term, and invoked the forty-five day limitation in recognition that most of the
trade debt at which they were aiming was short term.").
93. Ponoroff & Ashby, supra note 42, at 18.
94. See Nimmer, supra note 86, at 291.
95. See, e.g., Broome, supra note 42, at 121.
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to preference law for debts associated with delivery of goods in the
three months prior to bankruptcy, and debts for personal services.96
However, congressional revisions to the law ultimately led to the
Supreme Court's ruling that long-term debt issued by a lender
would satisfy the ordinary course exception,97 leaving the
exception more uncertain and less targeted towards its original
intended beneficiaries. 98
Some scholars have argued that the size of the transfer is what
matters and that small creditors or small transfers should be
exempt from the law, but this position is not without its critics.
Daniel Bussel has argued that pursuit of small preference actions is
akin to reorganizing deck chairs on the Titanic, and pushed for a
higher cap on preference liability actions.99 On the other hand,
Charles Tabb has voiced opposition to such a move on the
argument that a statutory cap for liability not only undermines the
equality goal of preference but also "might well encourage
aggressive pre-petition debt collection efforts for amounts of a few
thousand dollars, but slightly below [the cap] ."100
In light of Congress' expressed intention to discourage a "race
to the courthouse" and the premature dismantling of the debtor, it
is my view that the true "bad actors" Congress sought to deter must
be those with actual power to dismantle the debtor.101 The reference
to the courthouse suggests that those Congress had in mind were
judgment creditors-those who had successfully brought suit
96. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 2, at 168 (1973) (proposed exceptions for "(A) a debt for personal
services, (B) a debt for utilities incurred within three months of the petition, [or] (C) a debt
for inventory paid for within three months of the delivery of the goods in the ordinary course
of the debtor's business.").
97. See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 162 (1991).
98. See Tabb, supra note 43, at 441 (suggesting that the ABI Report demonstrates that
the ordinary course exception is not working well because "no one knows what it means,...
the application of the defense is inconsistent[, and] ... many respondents do not believe that
the defense affords sufficiently broad protection").
99. Bussel, supra note 73, at 12.
100. Brave New Word, supra note 43, at 434.
101. A broader reading of congressional intent would be that Congress intended to
discourage any attempt, however routine or ineffectual, to collect, although most discussion
by courts interpreting the law seems to imply the need for collection to have a significant or
disruptive effect on the debtor. See, e.g., In re Forman Enters., Inc., 293 B.R. 848, 855 (Bankr.
W.D. Penn. 2003); In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co., 184 B.R. 136, 140 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995); In re
Bourgeois, 58 B.R. 657, 660 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986); In re Air Fla. Sys. Inc., 50 B.R. 653, 656
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
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against the debtor -and who would be in a position to dismantle
the debtor by executing liens on the debtor's property pursuant to
their judgments. With the debtor's property in the sheriff's hands,
it would be impossible for the debtor to conduct business. In order
to continue, the debtor would be forced to file for bankruptcy, if
only to impose the automatic stay and enforce return of the estate
property to the debtor. In contrast, unsecured creditors who have
not yet obtained a judgment against a debtor have relatively little
leverage or ability to impact the debtor's business. They cannot
exercise self-help to insist on repayment and are limited to
collection tactics such as withholding future services and making
demanding phone calls. Nonetheless, it is often these unsecured
creditors -commonly trade creditors-who have extended credit
in the form of delayed payment on goods and services, who are
targeted by preference liability, despite the general perception that
such creditors were intended to be protected from liability.
B. True Targets
It is not uncommon for trade creditors to find themselves
subject to preference liability. Despite this, and perhaps because of
the relative infrequency of bankruptcy itself, many trade creditors
are astonished to hear that they are being sued, particularly when
they are still owed money by the debtor. Among this group, the less
sophisticated and less important creditors tend to suffer the most
from preference enforcement.102 Creditors who are familiar with
the law are more likely to take advantage of its defenses, and
creditors who are viewed as vital to the debtor's survival are
typically not targeted, at least not by a DIP in Chapter 11.103
Per the statute, a trustee may bring a preference action without
consideration of whether potential defenses exist.104 Still, before
102. See discussion infra note 113 and accompanying text.
103. See Brook E. Gotberg, Relational Preference in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 71 OKLA. L.
REV. (forthcoming).
104. The International Housewares Association (IHA), a major trade organization,
proposed in 2014 that § 547 be amended to shift the burden of proof to the trustee, rather
than creditors, that a payment is not a preference. See, e.g., Examining Sect. 547 and Its Effect
on Trade Creditors -Episode 153, AM. BANKR. INST. (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.abi.org
/podcasts/examining-sect-547-and-its-effect-on-trade-creditors-episode-153 [hereinafter
committing to the cost of filing a formal complaint, trustees often
engage in letter-writing campaigns to all creditors who received
transfers from the debtor in the ninety days before the bankruptcy
filing, citing the preference statute and demanding a return of the
funds transferred.105 Well-advised creditors typically respond with
evidence of possible defenses, which often leads to settlement of
those claims with the trustee for substantially less than what has
been demanded.106 Less sophisticated creditors may not realize that
defenses are available and when faced with the prospect of liability
may simply repay the entire amount.107 Although the exceptions to
preference law were intended to shield ordinary transactions from
liability, less sophisticated creditors may be unaware of these
defenses and may be unable or unwilling to hire counsel to defend
against a preference in a situation where they are already
losing money.
In Chapter 11, unsecured creditors who qualify for the coveted
title of "critical vendor" are not subject to preference liability.
Although the Bankruptcy Code does not acknowledge the term or
the concept of a critical vendor, courts across the country have
granted debtor motions to pay certain unsecured creditors their
pre-bankruptcy claims prior to the confirmation of a plan of
reorganization. 108 In support of a critical vendor motion, the debtor
argues that the ongoing cooperation of a specific creditor is
essential to the debtor's reorganization and cannot be obtained
Examining Sect. 547] (conversation between ABI Residence Scholar Lois Lupica and Dale
Matschullat, Chairman of IHA, and Bruce Kaminstein, CEO of Casabella Holdings, LLC).
105. In some cases, the trustee may not have time to engage in such a letter writing
campaign, however, and may find it necessary to file the action without preliminary
discussion or negotiation. A trustee faces a statute of limitations in bringing the preference
action and must sometimes file complaints without engaging in significant background
research simply in order to preserve the cause of action. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) (2006)
(imposing two-year statute of limitations on avoidance actions under § 547); COMMERCIAL
FIN. ASS'N, FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMERCIAL FINANCE ASSOCIATION TO THE ABI
COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11 (Nov. 15,2012) (complaining that trustees
need not weigh the likely value of their claims, and encouraging imposing a pleading burden
on trustees that there are no relevant defenses).
106. See Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017) ("Not because you're afraid to
take it to trial, that's not the issue. The issue is, . . .what's the cost for that litigation versus
what's the exposure and what you need to pay to be done with this.").
107. See ABI PREFERENCE SURVEY, supra note 53; discussion infra note 175.
108. See Alan N. Resnick, The Future of the Doctrine of Necessity and Critical-Vendor
Payments in Chapter 11 Cases, 47 B.C. L. REV. 183, 183 (2005).
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without repayment. Courts justify the special treatment of such
creditors under § 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and pre-Code
practices affording equitable priority to certain unsecured
creditors.109 Although not every court recognizes or upholds critical
vendor motions, 110 creditors who qualify for critical vendor status
are typically immune from preference liability.' Likewise, courts
have held that prepetition payments made under an executory
contract assumed by the debtor cannot be recovered as
preferences.112 A DIP may also simply elect not to pursue a claim
against a particular creditor, in order to avoid souring the
relationship or engaging in what is likely to be protracted
litigation.113 Other creditors may also escape preference liability on
the basis of the size of their claim and their location vis-a-vis the
109. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012); Resnick, supra note 108, at 186. Although generally
perceived to grant bankruptcy judges discretion to ensure that reorganizations will not be
unnecessarily stilted by inflexible rules, use of § 105(a) is subject to heavy criticism when
used in ways perceived to be contrary to the rest of the Code. See, e.g., Law v. Siegel, 134 S.
Ct. 1188, 1194 (2014) (requiring that § 105(a) yield to prohibitions found elsewhere in
the Code).
110. See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004); Chiasson v. J. Louis
Matherne & Assocs. (In re Oxford Mgmt., Inc.), 4 F.3d 1329 (5th Cir. 1993); B&W Enters., Inc.
v. Goodman Oil Co. (In re B&W Enters., Inc.), 713 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1983).
111. See Andrew J. Currie & Sean McCann, Hold on to Those Payments, Critical Vendors:
Capital Factors v. Kmart, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2003, at 33, 35 ("[V]endors should use an
agreement to provide post-petition goods and services on customary terms as an
opportunity to extract a promise from the debtor that it will not seek to assert preference
claims (or § 549 claims) against the vendor."); Telephone Interview with CA (May 30, 2017)
(noting that debtors may defend the decision not to pursue a preference on a creditor's status
as critical vendor).
112. See Newpage Corp. v. Avoca Bement Corp. (In re Newpage Corp.), 517 B.R. 508,
514 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014); MPF Holding U.S. L.L.C. v. Mustang Eng'g Ltd. (In re MPF Holding
U.S. L.L.C.), 495 B.R. 303 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013).
113. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2012) (noting that a trustee "may" avoid a preferential
transfer); see also discussion infra note 134 and accompanying text; Telephone Interview
with CA (May 25, 2017) (noting that some debtors may decide not to bring preference
actions for reputational reasons); Telephone Interview with DA (June 23, 2017) ("I mean,
if it's a smaller dollar amount and the liability is questionable, then maybe you don't
pursue those claims. I mean, this is kind of a cost-benefit analysis. If it's a million dollars,
then you're going to look at it much more seriously, but ten thousand dollars, you can
easily [eat] that with the legal fees; just to try to get it."); Telephone Interview with DA
(May 25, 2017) (weighing considerations of collectability, noting that most preference actions
are waived in a true reorganization).
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debtor, usually points that are irrelevant to the creditor's influence
over a bankruptcy filing.114
The less sophisticated, less informed, and less important
creditors that do find themselves subject to preference liability
usually lack any control over a debtor's bankruptcy filing,
including the power to effectively "push" a debtor into bankruptcy.
Frequently, such creditors have taken no affirmative action against
the debtor at all but have merely accepted payment on account of
their outstanding debts at the wrong time, and in the wrong way -
that is, outside one of the delineated exceptions to preference
liability. Preference law punishes rather than deters such creditors,
as they typically are unaware that liability is a possibility when they
collect.115 Further, the behavior of such creditors punished by
preference law is frequently the passive acceptance of payment
rather than any affirmative action, including a "race to the
courthouse." On the other hand, by excluding more savvy creditors
with power to impact the debtor, by virtue of exceptions and
discretion in bringing actions, the law allows some creditors who
may have deliberately improved their position prior to bankruptcy
at the expense of other creditors to escape liability. In sum, the law
fundamentally fails to target the behavior it wishes to deter by
being both under- and over-inclusive of transfers.
V. PREFERENCE MODEL OF DETERRENCE
As explained in this Part, the law fails to deter even individuals
who are familiar with its parameters because the likelihood of
liability and the penalty associated with preference liability
together do not justify the alteration of behavior pursuant to a
rational cost-benefit analysis. As discussed in Part II, a model can
gauge the effectiveness of penalties in deterring any inappropriate
114. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1409 (West 2016), the trustee is required to bring actions
for amounts less than $12,850 within the district court in which the defendant resides. This
alteration likely encouraged bankruptcy trustees to be more selective about cases they choose
to bring in distant venues, as it will cost the estate more to prosecute cases abroad. See Brave
New Word, supra note 43.
115. Rethinking Preferences, supra note 71 ("Deterrence is effective, however, only
against parties who are aware of the debtor's financial distress and who therefore see the
collective proceeding coming. Innocent parties by definition will not be deterred; the state of




behavior. The model for preference law, unfortunately, is not easy
to apply. It must incorporate uncertainty regarding enforcement,
due to factors over which the creditor has virtually no control, and
uncertainty regarding the associated punishment, due to a mix of
factors only some of which the creditor can control. This model, like
Becker's, does not explicitly acknowledge the weaknesses of
rational choice theory, including other factors that influence
individual behavior. But it is unnecessary to challenge the rational
choice assumption; even under that assumption, it is evident that
preference law is an ineffective deterrent. As I demonstrate in this
Part, empirical evidence further supports the conclusion that most
creditors do not change their behavior in response to preference
law, at least not in ways intended by the statute. The primary
factors within the preference model are, as in Becker's model, the
likelihood of enforcement and the severity of the punishment
associated with preference liability.
A. Likelihood of Punishment
1. Requirement of bankruptcy
Uncertainty regarding enforcement arises in preference law
because preferential transfers are only subject to punishment if the
debtor-or in rare cases, another creditor 16 - elects to invoke the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy and federal bankruptcy laws by
filing a bankruptcy petition. The likelihood of bankruptcy is
uncertain even in cases where the debtor is clearly insolvent, as the
debtor may decide to attempt other methods of reorganization or
simply to go out of business.117 Bankruptcy may be the most visible
and even the most common method for companies to attempt to
turn around their financial affairs, but it is by no means the only
option. An effort to increase the use of state insolvency proceedings
116. Creditors may file involuntary cases against a debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2012).
117. See Edward R. Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy: Small Business Workouts
and State Law, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 255, 260-61 (2009) (reporting that in 1990, business
bankruptcy filings amounted to only about twelve percent of all business failures). It is worth
noting that most business failures involve no attempt to reorganize at all. Instead, the
company simply ceases to exist as a going concern, and creditors are left to attempt collection
efforts under state law or write off losses, as the situation allows. Id.
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has been observed across recent years, 118 and the majority of states
do not recognize a general cause of action for preferential
transfers.119 Accordingly, in most cases there will be no preference
liability if a debtor does not file for bankruptcy.
In addition to requiring a bankruptcy filing, preference liability
is also limited to situations where the debtor has filed within ninety
days of a given transfer. In absolute terms, the likelihood of any
given business filing for bankruptcy within a three-month period is
very low. Out of an estimated 29 million businesses in the United
States, 120 less than 6000 companies file for bankruptcy in a given
three-month period.12 1 This places the likelihood of a given com-
pany filing for bankruptcy at roughly 0.02%. Some bankruptcies
may be easier to predict than others, and obviously the likelihood
of a bankruptcy filing may be higher if the company is known to be
struggling, but even then, bankruptcy is not an inevitability. The
ultimate decision of whether and when to file for bankruptcy
generally lies with the debtor. More sophisticated creditors may
negotiate with debtors to file more than ninety days after a
particular transfer has taken place, but most unsecured creditors
have little to no influence over the timing of a bankruptcy. 122
118. See, e.g., Andrew B. Dawson, Better than Bankruptcy?, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV.
137 (2016).
119. Many states do have preference laws that apply in the context of bank or insurance
company insolvency. Such companies may not be debtors under federal bankruptcy law. See
11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (2012); David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and
Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEx. L. REV. 471, 493, 516-26 (1994) (arguing for shifting authority
over corporate bankruptcy back to the states to encourage greater consistency between state
and federal insolvency laws). Roughly half of all state preference actions require a showing
of preferential intent from the debtor, which is difficult to prove and entirely absent from
federal law. See Broome, supra note 42, at 93-94.
120. See OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
1 (June 2016), http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/SB-FAQ-2016_WEB.pdf
(estimate is as of 2013).
121. U.S. Courts' statistics report a total of 5669 commercial filings (including farms,
fisheries, and wage worker filings identified as "business filings") for the first quarter of
2018, U.S. COURTS, CASELOAD STATISTICS DATA TABLES tbl.F-2 (Mar. 31, 2018), http://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data-tables/bf f2.3_0331.2018.pdf; and a total of
23,157 commercial filings in the entire year of 2017, U.S. COURTS, CASELOAD STATISTICS DATA
TABLES tbl.F-5A (Dec. 31, 2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data-tables
/bf f5a 1231.2017.pdf.
122. Creditors cannot control the risk of a bankruptcy filing by prohibiting a debtor
from filing a bankruptcy case or by invoking penalties for filing for bankruptcy. Such
attempts are rendered null and void pursuant to bankruptcy law. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.
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2. Uncertainty of enforcement
Prior studies of deterrence have concluded that probability of
conviction is significantly more impactful to deterrence than the
severity of punishment.123 Preference liability within a bankruptcy
case is highly contingent upon a variety of factors, including the
chapter of bankruptcy in which the case will proceed, the
availability of defenses for vulnerable creditors, the presence and
activity of a creditor's committee, and the intended outcome of the
company in the reorganization proceedings. The creditor's
relationship with and importance to the debtor's business going
forward may also play a factor, both for critical vendors and for
other creditors not so specified.124
Preference actions are significantly more common in Chapter 7
liquidation proceedings and Chapter 11 liquidation cases than in
Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings. The most obvious expla-
nation for the discrepancy is that all parties recognize that
preference proceedings -effectively lawsuits raised by the debtor
against the creditors-may be bad for business and bad for
relationships going forward.125 Accordingly, debtors are typically
reluctant to pursue preference actions in reorganization
proceedings where ongoing relationships are important. The same
reluctance does not exist in liquidation proceedings where there is
§§ 365(e)(1), 541(c)(1)(B) (2012). On the other hand, creditors may offer benefits to a debtor
on the condition that the debtor not file for bankruptcy, and otherwise work with the debtor
in an attempt to avoid bankruptcy proceedings. Such efforts to negotiate an agreement are
always colored by the reality that, if the benefits are inadequate or outside pressures to file
too strong, the debtor can always revert to a bankruptcy petition for relief.
123. See Becker, supra note 17, at 176 ("[A] common generalization by persons with
judicial experience is that a change in the probability [of punishment] has a greater effect on
the number of offenses than a change in the punishment."); Travis C. Pratt et al., The Empirical
Status of Deterrence Theory: A Meta-Analysis, in TAKING STOCK: THE STATUS OF
CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 367 (Francis T. Cullen et al. eds., Transaction Publishers 2006)
(observing that crime and deviance are more accurately predicted by peer effects or self-
control than by deterrence variables but that, of all deterrence factors, certainty of
punishment was the most influential in affecting behavior).
124. See discussion supra note 113.
125. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017) (observing that debtors may
choose not to pursue a preference because the reputational cost may make doing so not
worth the effort); Telephone Interview with DA (May 19, 2017) (" [P]reference actions don't
really engender a lot of good will.... I mean it's only a good idea if you really need
the money.").
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no chance for ongoing relationships; 126 Chapter 7 trustees have a
reputation for being more aggressive and active in pursuing
preference actions than the average DIP.127
In either chapter, trustees and DIPs are less inclined to bring
preference actions in situations where the creditor may have a
strong defense. This is consistent with regular notions of litigation
strategy--the goal for both trustees and DIPs is to maximize the
recovery for the debtor's estate while minimizing the costs
associated with that recovery. Accordingly, most preference
proceedings begin with a letter-writing campaign in which the
debtor's representative will contact those who have received
payments from the debtor in the previous ninety days with a
demand to return such payments.1 28 Response to this letter-writing
campaign will determine which complaints are actually filed.
Creditors may respond to letters with the offer of a nuisance
settlement, a blanket denial of any liability, or a demonstration of
possible defenses. These responses, especially the demonstration of
a strong defense,. may prompt a trustee or DIP to abandon the
preference claim altogether.1 29
126. Often, when preference actions are brought in a Chapter 11 case, it is in the context
of a liquidation plan or a liquidating trust, put in place after the sale of the company has been
successfully concluded. See discussion infra note 129
127. See Adelphia Commc'ns Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Adelphia Commc'ns
Corp.), 330 B.R. 364, 373 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Debtors sometimes lack the inclination, or
the means, to bring actions that should be prosecuted. They sometimes have higher
priorities, or are distracted by other things. They sometimes have a practical need to avoid
confrontation with entities like their secured lenders, because they need those entities'
continuing cooperation-as, for example, in connection with exit financing."); Nancy Haller,
Cybergenics 1I: Precedent and Policy vs. Plain Meaning, 56 ME. L. REV. 365, 384-85 (2004) ("A
debtor-in-possession... may use the trustee provisions to favor certain creditors; may be
unwilling to avoid transactions with a supplier or lender with whom it hopes to continue a
business relationship after a successful reorganization; or may have developed friendships
that make it difficult to choose to pursue actions with severe economic impacts.").
128. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017); Telephone Interview with DA
(July 14, 2017) ("Mostly people look at preferences like, let me try and shake the tree to see if
I can get some extra money."); Telephone Interview with DA (June 23, 2017) (" [Ylou're going
to send at least a demand to see if he can shake the trees and get money out of them.");
Telephone Interview with DA (May 25, 2017).
129. They may drop the claim both for efficiency reasons -it is likely to cost too much
to pursue in light of the likely recovery -and for fear of repercussions if they continue to
pursue what looks like a losing case. Courts have ruled that a trustee may be held liable for
sanctions under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 for bringing a preference action without adequately
investigating the availability of an affirmative defense. See In re Excello Press, Inc., 967 F.2d
1109, 1112 (7th Cir. 1992) (ruling that at times a trustee may have a responsibility to examine
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3. The strategic importance of a creditor
For cases that proceed in Chapter 11, creditors may be in a
position to influence whether and which preference claims are
brought. Creditors are typically more involved in Chapter 11 cases
than they are in Chapter 7 and have influence over the shape of the
case. For example, in Chapter 11, creditors are able to vote in favor
or against the debtor's plan of reorganization. 130 The U.S. Trustee
may also appoint a creditor's committee, which can employ its own
counsel - paid from the estate's administrative funds - to oversee
the proceedings and petition the court for action when necessary.131
A creditor's committee might have different opinions regarding
preference actions depending on the circumstances of the case. For
example, the committee may be enthusiastic about the recovery of
a significant preferential transfer from an insider or a secured
creditor, but less enthusiastic about recovering a plethora of smaller
preferential transfers from among its own membership- typically
unsecured trade creditors. It is common for the committee to
negotiate a provision in the plan of reorganization abandoning all
preference claims, turning over all preference claims to the
committee or to a liquidating trust, or otherwise adjusting how
such claims will, or will not, be pursued.132 Individual creditors
who have influence over the creditor's committee are accordingly
in a better place than others to influence whether, and against
whom, preference actions are brought.
Chapter 11 debtors may also be more selective than Chapter 7
trustees regarding which preference actions, if any, they elect to
whether any obvious affirmative defenses bar the case); Thomas D. Goldberg, Curbing
Abusive Preference Actions: Rethinking Claims on Behalf of Administratively Insolvent Estates, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., May 2004, at *14, *17 (citing ethical reasons why a practitioner should not
commence a preference action where there may be meritorious affirmative defenses).
130. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2012).
131. See id. §§ 1102-1103.
132. See, e.g., Moecker v. Johnson (in re Transit Group, Inc.), 332 B.R. 45,53 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 2005) (observing that the plan of reorganization assigned the debtor's rights to prosecute
avoidance actions to the creditors' committee); see also Telephone Interview with CA (Aug.
8, 2017) (noting common practice of putting preference actions into a trust for the benefit of
creditors); Telephone Interview with DA (June 19, 2017) (stating that these days preference
actions are all brought by a liquidating trust); Telephone Interview with PC-B (Sept. 7, 2017)
("Whoever the creditors were, hired [a] collection company to shake down all the people
[who] had been paid for services rendered within the ninety-day window.").
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pursue.133 Attorneys interviewed for this project were divided on
whether the Bankruptcy Code sanctions this sort of selectivity.
Most argued that the permissive language of the Code, indicating
that the trustee or DIP "may avoid" preferential transfers, is
deliberate, and permits a debtor to pursue or ignore preferences in
keeping with its best interest in the long term.134 Others noted the
duty of the debtor to maximize recovery for all creditors, and
concluded the debtor is bound to pursue all preferences regardless
of whether doing so may be bad for the debtor's future business
dealings.135 All agreed that preference actions are typically a low
priority and tend to be pursued, if at all, after more pressing issues
of estate administration have been settled. In many cases,
preference actions are only brought after the plan has already been
approved so as to minimize potential negative ramifications for the
vote on the plan.136
When the plan of reorganization involves selling the debtor as
a going concern, the purchasing buyer may negotiate for any pref-
erence claims to be sold as part of the deal. However, the buyer will
133. The same permissive language would apply to Chapter 7 trustees who "may"
avoid which preferences they prefer. However, Chapter 7 trustees are less likely than debtors
to discriminate between creditors and more likely to examine potential preference actions
solely on their merits, rather than evaluating the strategic value of a given creditor. This is
true for the simple reason that a Chapter 7 trustee is unconcerned with a debtor's ability to
continue as a going concern and the need to do business with creditors going forward. Once
the case is in Chapter 7, the decision to liquidate the business has already been made. Further,
Chapter 7 trustees are compensated as a percentage of the dollar amount they bring into the
estate and, accordingly, are personally incentivized to maximize the dollar return regardless
of where the dollar comes from. See 11 U.S.C. § 326 (2012).
134. Id. § 547 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Telephone Interview with DA (June 20,
2017) ("I think it is a 'may.' I don't think you are required to bring [preference actions] and I
think the Bankruptcy Code allows for that decision-making process."); Telephone interview
with DA (May 19, 2017) ("[l]t's a permissive section you know; it says that they may bring
them. So, I think that's there for a real reason.").
135. See Telephone Interview with DA (June 23, 2017) ("You really can't do that, when
you're representing a Chapter 11 debtor. You're a fiduciary of the debtor in possession.");
Telephone Interview with DA (June 6,2017) ("I think you have to. I don't think you're doing
your job if you don't.... [Y]our debtor's a fiduciary; they got to do what's right.").
136. See Telephone Interview with DA (June 23, 2017) ("[I]f it's in a Chapter 11 you
typically try to avoid doing those [preference actions] until after a plan's confirmed or
something. Because if you do that during the pendency of the case you're going to not have
a very happy creditor. They're not going to be too terribly supportive of your reorganization
efforts."); Telephone Interview with DA (May 19, 2017) ("[A] lot of times, people wait until
after the plan is confirmed and then sometimes they'll pursue those actions and sometimes
not."); discussion supra note 126.
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generally decline to pursue such preferences, determining that
their negative effects on business relationships will outweigh what-
ever income they may generate. 137 This may be controversial for the
creditor's committee, particularly if the avoidance actions are some
of the only remaining assets available to unsecured creditors. 138
Although trade creditors are generally very much in favor of
restricting preference liability,139 there may be instances in which
the recovery of a preference is their only recovery in bankruptcy.
Ultimately, the enforcement of any given preference claim is
highly uncertain and subject to a wide variety of factors, especially
in Chapter 11 reorganization cases. The probability of preference
liability for a creditor is negatively associated with the strategic
importance of the creditor to the debtor's business and stated
defenses to liability. Accordingly, the probability of a preference
action being raised decreases with the sophistication of a creditor,
leading more sophisticated creditors to be less deterred from pre-
bankruptcy opt-out behavior.140
137. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with CA (July 26, 2017) ("[W]e have seen in the sale
of asset cases where buyers through their asset purchase agreements and then assuming the
preference actions, essentially buying those actions from the bankruptcy estate, and out of
the self-interest that they don't want to, sue future customers as part of their acquisition.");
Telephone Interview with CA (June 21,2017) ("Sometimes the buyer will buy those litigation
claims and not ever pursue them because the buyer doesn't want a liquidating trustee to sue
them because they're suppliers now."); Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017) ("The
buyer, I think the vast majority of the time, negotiates to protect vendors that they will
continue to do business with.").
138. For obvious reasons, the sale of a company tends to be for an amount sufficient to
satisfy all secured creditors but not necessarily sufficient to satisfy the claims of unsecured
creditors. When avoidance actions are granted to creditors' committees instead, they may
exercise discretion in whom the actions are brought against. See Telephone Interview with
CA (June 21, 2017) (noting that committees prefer to bring preference actions against
corporate insiders rather than one of their own trade creditors).
139. See Brave New World, supra note 43, at 439 (2005) (" [Ulniess one's ox got gored more
than average, economic rationality might argue for accepting a pro-trustee venue system.
That economic argument, though, is utterly unpersuasive to trade creditors-a truth to
which I personally can attest as Reporter for the ABI Preference Study, where I tried in vain
to make that argument to the trade creditor representatives."); see also Examining Sect. 547,
supra note 104.
140. The probability of a successful preference action, p, is a function of the probability
of a bankruptcy filing within ninety days, Pb; the strength of the creditor, including possible
defenses and negotiating power, p,; and the amount of discretion exercised by the debtor in
bringing preference actions, itself informed by chapter choice, pd. The amount a creditor
expends on defense costs, c, may also influence the probability of a preference action by
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B. Expected Liability
Expected liability associated with preference actions is
consistently lower than the expected benefit across all creditor
types. The penalty associated with accepting a preferential transfer
is limited to the avoidance of that transfer -in layman's terms, the
creditor must give back whatever it received from the debtor in
exchange for a claim against the debtor's estate. Assuming the
creditor does not expend any additional, unrecoverable costs to
collect or defend a preference, the worst-case scenario is a wash.
From the creditor's perspective, then, there are no actual risks
associated with recovery during the preference period. As noted
by Tabb:
An economically rational creditor usually will decide to take a
preference. The only sanction of the bankruptcy preference law is
that the preferred creditor has to return the money paid, thereby
returning to the status that it had before receipt of the preferential
transfer.... [T]he only potentially lost costs are those associated
with receiving the preference in the first place-for example,
sheriff's fees and attorneys [sic] fees-and with defending a
preference lawsuit, if the creditor chooses to do so.1 41
John McCoid has also observed that, due to the often-significant
delay between receipt of a transfer and its recovery by the trustee,
creditors may be better off even if they are required to return the
full dollar amount of what they collected, due to the time value of
money.142 And the penalty demanded by the trustee or the DIP is
usually far less than the full amount of the preference, for the
simple reason that the debtor would have to expend funds, time,
and attention to obtain a judgment for the full amount of the
preference recovery. Each of these three resources is at a premium
strengthening the bargaining power or possible defenses of the creditor, represented by p,
Accordingly, p = p (pb, pT, Pd).
141. Rethinking Preferences, supra note 71, at 991 (footnote omitted).
142. McCoid, supra note 35, at 264; see also E-mail from Paul Schrader, supra note 79
(suggesting that the vast majority of creditors would prefer to have money now that they
will need to repay over the possibility of a payment at the end of the bankruptcy case). It is
worth noting that under English law, unlawful preferences may give rise to a claim of
interest against the recipient, although there is some lack of clarity on when the interest
should begin to accrue. See Adrian Walters, Preferences, in VULNERABLE TRANSACTIONS IN
CORPORATE INSOLVENCY 123 (John Armour & Howard Bennett eds., 2003).
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in any bankruptcy case, whether in Chapter 7 or 11, opening the
door to settlement between the parties even in cases of
clear liability. One survey of practitioners estimated that the
percentage of the claim settled for was, on average, 58.5%, with
wide variation.143
Much of the variation can be explained by the availability or
absence of relevant defenses. Creditors who can predict a
bankruptcy filing may adjust their behavior to better align with
these defenses in the days leading up to a debtor's bankruptcy,
which can both weaken a debtor's incentives to bring a preference
action and strengthen a creditor's ability to defend against it.144
Even creditors who have failed to make adjustments in advance of
a bankruptcy filing may, upon advice of counsel, make persuasive
arguments that would encourage settlement rather than litigation
of issues like the ordinary course exception. Between the
advantages of advance planning and strong counsel, the creditors
who pay the least in settlement, and are therefore the least deterred,
are typically those with access to a debtor's financials who have the
ability to structure payments from the debtor in the days before
bankruptcy and the resources to hire representation in the
subsequent bankruptcy case. To the extent that preference is
intended to deter "in-the-know" creditors from altering their
143. ABI PREFERENCE SURVEY, supra note 53; see also E-mail from Paul Schrader, supra
note 79 (on file with author) (" [T]he take of trustees and counsel from preference recoveries
is often in the 20%-40% range."); Telephone Interview with CA (Aug. 8, 2017) ("The only
thing I guess I would say with certainty is less than half. I've seen as low as 10% or less I
suppose, it was rare that it was more than 50%."); Telephone Interview with CA July 26,
2017) ("[A]s a rule of thumb, [the settlement] should be less than 10%."); Telephone Interview
with CA June 6, 2017) ("In the practical scheme of things they'll take 50 cents on the dollar
back, 60 cents."); Telephone Interview with CA (May 18,2017) (reference to choking a $25,000
claim to $10,000); Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017) (pointing out that settlement
payments of up to 75% are made on transfers with no defense, and up to 25% on transfers
for which there is a good defense); Telephone Interview with DA (Aug. 31, 2017) (stating that
settlement amount ranges from 25 to 90% of the claimed amount); Telephone Interview with
DA July 17, 2017) (stating that preference claims are settled for 20% or less of the face value);
Telephone Interview with DA July 14, 2017) (stating that settlements are 10 to 20% of what
is owed); Telephone Interview with DA (June 6, 2017) ("They always settle and they always
settle for 40 to 60 cents [on the dollar].").
144. McCoid, supra note 35, at 266 (noting that preference law operates to favor
creditors with more inside information regarding the debtor's financial situation over those
who are less aware).
behavior in the days leading up to bankruptcy, it fails most where
it is most needed. 145
C. Preference Deterrence Model
As explained above, the function for deterrence in preference
law is different than it is in the context of criminal law. At its core,
however, the two analyses are similar. It might be stated that
Ri = Ri (pi, li, ci),
where R is a creditor's expected recovery of past-due debt from
the debtor following collection efforts, p is the probability of a
preference action being successfully maintained against the
creditor, I is the liability of the creditor, and c are associated costs,
such as the fees of an attorney or creditor manager who oversees
the collection account and negotiates with the debtor and the
debtor's estate. Expressed as a utility model, we might say that
R = (l-p) r + p (r - (1 + d)),
where R is a creditor's total expected recovery when p is the
probability of a successful preference action, r is the amount
transferred from debtor to the creditor during the preference
period, I is the amount repaid to the debtor's estate pursuant to the
settlement agreement or judgment, and d represents costs
associated with defending the preference action. In plain language,
a creditor's expected recovery is higher when p, 1, and d, are lower,
that is, when preference actions are less likely, and preference
awards and associated costs are lower.
We must then add to the utility model to account for the
creditor's entitlement to a claim against the estate on account of the
amount avoided as a preference. The money returned by the
creditor to the debtor pursuant to preference liability is, after all,
rightfully due and owing, and the creditor is entitled to distribution
145. Bussel, supra note 73, at 14 (noting that preference law plays the necessary and
important role of "controlling express opt-out behavior by in-the-know creditors, especially
insider-creditors").
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on account of that claim in liquidation or according to a plan of
reorganization. The new calculation becomes:
R = (1-p) r + p (r - (1 + d) + PR (1)).
In this equation, PR signifies the pro rata percentage that an
unsecured creditor can expect from the bankruptcy estate as part of
the overall creditor recovery.
Theoretically, a creditor would use this equation to weigh the
expected returns of obtaining payment from the debtor when the
debtor is insolvent against the expected returns of not seeking or
accepting payment. Analysis of the equation quickly demonstrates
that R is presumptively higher when a creditor collects than when
a creditor does nothing. In fact, as creditors become more
sophisticated, their expected return on collection over non-
collection grows. This means that sophisticated creditors are less
likely to be deterred by preference liability, and therefore more
likely to pursue preference payments from the debtor in the days
leading up to bankruptcy.
Collection is more profitable than failure to collect even if
preference liability is a near-certainty, so long as the expected
settlement payment and associated costs do not exceed the amount
recovered from the debtor.
If r > (1 + d), then R > 0.
In other words, so long as creditors are careful not to spend more
defending against preference liability than they can reduce their
overall liability through negotiation with the trustee or the DIP,
they will be better off taking the risk. Accordingly, a first level
approximation of creditors' expected recovery indicates that
sophisticated creditors who are efficient in their defense costs will
always choose to accept or even demand payment from a debtor,
however likely a resultant preference action may be. Of course, the
less likely a preference action is, the higher the expected recovery.
Creditors generally can control the costs of defending a prefer-
ence action. In addition, creditors will only need to incur such costs
after bankruptcy has been filed. Accordingly, creditors may
evaluate, based on factors informing the probability of a successful
preference action and the likelihood of favorable settlement terms,
how much to spend to maximize probable recovery. In cases where
there is a low probability of defenses and low strategic power, the
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creditor can expend little to nothing on a defense. In cases where
the creditor is better able to exert influence or argue defenses, the
creditor may expend more on costs to maximize recovery. Savvy
creditors will not spend more than they expect to reduce their
liability. In other words, creditors will ensure that
d<r-l,
such that attempts to collect r will always result in a higher
payout than doing nothing.
Although creditors cannot control or even always predict when
preference liability may happen, they can reduce the likelihood that
liability will result in a net negative by ensuring that costs of
defense do not exceed the expected reduction in liability. As a
consequence, even though creditors despise being targeted for
preference actions, they do not reduce their collection activities in
the face of possible preference liability. Even creditors who face
liability do not regret having collected in the first place. When
asked what they might have done differently to avoid liability, the
only proposed change they would make in their behavior moving
forward is to be more cautious in lending to other debtors who may
eventually find themselves in bankruptcy.146
D. Empirical Findings
Up to now, there has been a great deal of skepticism over the
extent to which preference law is effective as a deterrent but little
to no evidence establishing or refuting its effectiveness. 147
Information regarding the impact of preference law in the real
world is notoriously difficult to obtain, in large part because so little
of preference enforcement is in the court record. Many preference
actions are settled before a complaint is even filed, leaving no
146. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with PC (Sept. 14, 2017); Telephone Interview with
PC-B (Sept. 7, 2017) (" [W]e're more risk-averse than we were, so that means companies that
need help don't get as much of our expertise."). The Bankruptcy Code was amended in 2005
to include the value of goods received by the debtor in the twenty days before the bankruptcy
filing as an administrative expense, in order to counteract the perceived reluctance to give
even short-term credit to a company struggling with insolvency. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(9) (2012).
147. See McCoid supra note 35, at 263 ("[T]estimony [that preference law is effective as
deterrence] is generally either anecdotal or conclusory.").
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evidence of the preference at all other than a record of potentially
preferential payments in a debtor's initial disclosures.148 In some
cases, debtors may state in their Chapter 11 plan disclosure
documents that preference actions have been considered but will
not be brought to trial, with no explanation as to whether they were
simply dropped or pursued and settled.149 Previous efforts to study
preferences have consistently run into this difficulty, and more
empirical research on the topic is necessary. 150
My primary goal in the instant study was to understand the
effect of preference law on creditor behavior. In conducting my
interviews, the opinions and observations I heard largely echoed
the findings of a previous study on preferences conducted by the
American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) Bankruptcy Reform Study
Project in 1995-96. The ABI had formed a Task Force to study
preference law in response to concerns voiced over the perceived
unfairness of preference law. As part of its study, the Task Force
prepared two surveys, one directed at creditor providers and the
other at bankruptcy practitioners, to elicit information and opinions
on preference law.151 Unsurprisingly, survey results indicated that
credit providers were much more critical of preference law than
practitioners, but both groups believed that preference laws
penalized creditors who attempted to work with debtors by
accepting settlements or workouts in the days prior to bank-
ruptcy.152 These findings suggest that the deterrent effect of prefer-
ence law has been turned on its head-rather than discouraging
creditors from dismantling the debtor in the days leading up to
bankruptcy, it discourages creditors from working with the debtor
148. As part of a debtor's required schedules to be filed with the court, the debtor must
provide a list of all transfers that have taken place within the previous ninety days. See U.S.
COURTS, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS FOR NON-INDIVIDUALS FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY:
OFFICIAL FORM 207 (Apr. 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/form b 207.pdf.
149. See, e.g., Debtor's Disclosure Statement at 17, In re Bermo Enterprises, Inc., Bankr.
W.D. Mich. (2013) (No. 12-10207) (noting that debtor's rights to avoidance actions are
preserved, but releasing, without explanation, all avoidance claims except for a specified
group); cf. Busick Insulated Glass, Inc.'s Second Amended Disclosure Statement for its
Second Amended Plan of Reorganization at 7, In re Busick Insulated Glass, Inc., Bankr. W.D.
Mich. (2013) (Doc. 142) (reporting settlement amount and decision not to pursue alternative
actions in light of likely defenses).
150. Ponoroff, supra note 2, at 346, 356.
151. See ABI PREFERENCE SURVEY, supra note 53, at 2.
152. See id. at 2.
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to avoid premature dismantling.15 3 My research sought to better
understand how preference law impacts creditor behavior through
in-depth interviews with individuals who had recently been part of
a Chapter 11 case.
In order to identify possible subjects, I used the Bloomberg Law
search engine to pull public bankruptcy records for all Chapter 11
cases with a confirmed plan that closed sometime between August
30, 2010, and February 1, 2017. I limited my search to companies
with assets and liabilities in the range of $1 million and $100 million
that also listed unsecured trade creditors in their schedules. Within
this sample, I looked for companies that had filed a preference
action against a creditor, searching within court documents for any
reference to § 547 (the Code section for preference avoidance).154 I
excluded cases that ended in liquidation of the debtor's assets,
although I included cases where the company was sold as a going
concern. For each of the cases within my sample, I identified the top
twenty unsecured creditors, as listed by the debtor on Official
Form 4. I further identified any additional creditors who were the
subject of a preference lawsuit, as reflected in the court record. I
excluded creditors located outside the United States, taxing entities,
insiders, creditors subject to an action under § 544,155 and judg-
ment creditors. 156
153. As much has been suggested by other scholars as well. See McCoid, supra note 35,
at 261 n.78 (noting that preference may be given by the debtor to induce a creditor to come
to the debtor's assistance and facilitate rehabilitation, but possible avoidance of such a
preference weakens the debtor's ability to use it as an incentive); see also Denney v. Dana, 56
Mass. (2 Cush.) 160, 171-72 (1848).
154. The Bankruptcy Code contains additional provisions that allow a trustee to sue
creditors for similar causes. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1) (2012) (allowing the trustee to
recover the amount offset by a creditor in the 90 days before bankruptcy on a preference-like
analysis). However, I did not target these provisions for consideration in my study.
155. Creditors may be liable under 11 U.S.C. § 544 if they have not perfected their
otherwise valid security interests prior to the bankruptcy filing. Pursuant to § 544 of the
Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy trustee is afforded all the rights of a hypothetical lien
creditor who obtained a judicial lien over all of the debtor's property as of the
commencement of the case. Pursuant to the rules of secured transactions, as reflected in UCC
§ 9-317(a), the bankruptcy trustee would prevail over any secured creditor not perfected as
of the date of filing.
156. The exclusion of judgment creditors was due primarily to my desire to focus on
how bankruptcy filings and preference actions affected business relationships between
debtors and creditors. When creditors were identified as judgment creditors, it appeared to
distinguish them from creditors who were or had been engaged in ongoing business dealings
with the debtor ("trade creditors").
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I mailed introductory letters to the remaining creditors, as well
as to the debtor and all attorneys of record. I sent mailings one case
at a time, beginning with the five most recent cases and then
proceeding in alphabetical order until I had sent mailings to around
350 individuals. A few weeks later, I attempted to call the
individual creditors, debtors, and attorneys for whom I could locate
telephone numbers. 157 If I was successful in reaching an individual,
I made the request to interview them for this study.158 In many
cases, I left messages on voicemail or with an assistant. Where I left
messages, I attempted a second phone call before abandoning
the contact.
Through these efforts, I was able to obtain complete interviews
from forty-eight individuals, including twenty-eight creditors,
three debtors, 159 and seventeen attorneys. 160 Of the creditors who
consented to be interviewed, eleven had themselves been the
subject of a preference action. Of the attorneys interviewed, all had
experience with preferential transfers, albeit on different sides of
the aisle and at different times. Ten of the attorneys represented the
debtor in the case that was the subject of the study, and the
remaining seven represented a creditor, although most of the
attorneys represented a mix of debtors and creditors in bankruptcy
cases over the scope of their careers. 161 The size of the company with
which individuals were associated varied widely. Some creditors
interviewed were sole practitioners or "mom-and-pop" shops,
while others were associated with large international organiza-
tions. The interviewees represented a diverse population geo-
graphically. They hailed from eighteen different states, including
New York, Florida, and California, as well as Kansas, Michigan,
157. Some individuals responded to my letter with requests not to be contacted. For
others, the introductory letter was returned as undeliverable. In these cases, I did not make
further attempts to contact.
158. As per University protocol, I obtained advance approval for this study from the
Institutional Review Board. Documentation on file with the author.
159. The ratio of debtor to creditor interviews largely reflects the overall ratio within
cases. Obviously, each individual debtor had multiple creditors.
160. One attorney interviewed was referred by another study participant, based on his
experience and familiarity with preference actions, and so was not contacted by virtue of his
involvement in one of the sample cases. As explained below, because all attorneys spoke
generally regarding their overall experiences rather than providing specifics for a given case,
participation in a case within the sample was not essential.
161. Attorneys who agreed to a formal interview represented a combined 515 years of
experience in insolvency proceedings.
and North Dakota. Interviews lasted anywhere from ten minutes to
over an hour, with most falling in the range of fifteen- to twenty-
minute conversations. All interviews were conducted in a five-
month period, between May 18, 2017, and October 18, 2017.
In preparing for and conducting these interviews, I was aware
of the danger that, through my questions, I might impose my own
views or suggest desired responses. Accordingly, I relied primarily
on broad, open-ended questions, asking for more specific details
only when I did not fully understand the responses given.
Questions differed depending on the participant. For creditors and
debtors, I asked for information specifically relating to the
particular case in which they had been involved. For example, I
asked the creditors whether they were surprised by the debtor's
decision to file for bankruptcy, how the debtor's bankruptcy had
affected their own business, and whether they were satisfied with
the outcome of the bankruptcy. I asked debtors how they made the
decision to file for bankruptcy and how they made the decision
whether or not to bring a preference action against creditors. I
asked attorneys for their general observations based on experiences
across bankruptcy cases (in part to avoid concerns regarding
confidentiality for any given case), whether creditors were likely to
predict a preference action and whether, in their view, such a
prediction deterred attempts to collect.
Interview responses reflected a variety of experiences, which
one would expect from a diverse group of individuals, but several
common themes developed quickly and consistently from the
collected statements of interviewees. First, debtors seem to bring
preference actions only against those creditors who are less
necessary for the debtor's ongoing survival.162 In other words,
debtors will target creditors who are less useful or less important to
the debtor. Further, attorneys reported that it was extremely rare to
see a preference action brought against any creditor during a "true"
162. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017) (filed preference actions either
when significantly large or when the debtor "didn't really care about the creditor anymore,
didn't need the creditor's support"); Telephone Interview with CA (May 18, 2017) (noting
that client subjected to preference action was a "sacrificial lamb" that the debtor no longer
required); Telephone Interview with PC (June 19, 2017) ("There were [other] people who
were given preferential treatment and they never got lawsuits against them at all.").
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Chapter 11 reorganization and that such claims were typically only
exercised in Chapter 7 or in a Chapter 11 liquidation.163 As ex-
pressed by one debtor's attorney,
if you're working with a client and he's selling you something that
you need and you have a good relationship with him, you're not
going to sue him to repay $50,000. Especially if your Plan's been
confirmed.... But, you do see it a lot in the liquidation cases.164
When claims are brought in a Chapter 11 reorganization, they are
typically brought at the end of the case by a third party, such as the
head of a liquidating trust or the creditor's committee. 165
Second, larger, more sophisticated creditors anticipate and
respond to preference claims differently than smaller, less
sophisticated creditors. Larger creditors frequently employ in-
house credit managers to monitor their lines of credit and
payments.1 66 These creditors, by virtue of the monitoring and
experience, are frequently able to confidently predict a possible
163. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 30, 2017) ("[In my experience the trade
creditors are being pursued by the Chapter 7 trustee, the liquidating trust trustee coming out
of the bankruptcy so that there isn't an ongoing Chapter 11 debtor that needs the relation-
ship, because he's not going to pursue the preference action against a party that is needed
for the business, if there is an ongoing business."); Telephone Interview with DA (June 6,
2017) ("I can't think of a Chapter 11 that I have filed in the last five years where there was a
lot of preference action.").
164. Telephone Interview with DA (May 19, 2017); see also Telephone Interview with
DA (May 25, 2017) ("[T]ypically, in a true reorganization as opposed to a sale case or a
liquidation... you normally give up, waive, any right to bring preference actions as part-
and-parcel of your confirmation process.").
165. See Telephone Interview with CA (July 26,2017) ("[If preference actions are going
to be pursued... [i]t's not going to be by the debtor, it's going to be by a third party ...
commonly a liquidating trust."). This finding was somewhat inconsistent with the results of
the 1997 survey distributed by the ABI, which suggested that preference litigation is-or
was-fairly frequent, even in Chapter 11 cases pre-confirmation. ABI PREFERENCE SURVEY,
supra note 53, at 7 (indicating that over 70% of practitioners said preference litigation was
commenced sometimes or frequently in Chapter 7 and post-confirmation in Chapter 11, and
over half responded in like fashion for Chapter 11 pre-confirmation). This inconsistency
might be explained by the fact that the ABI survey did not distinguish between reorganizing
and liquidating Chapter 11 cases in its question, and the fact that liquidating Chapter Us
have become increasingly common in the intervening decades. See Chad P. Pugatch et al.,
The Lost Art of Chapter 11 Reorganization, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 39, 61-63 (2008).
166. That said, size did not always signal sophistication. In at least one instance, a
smaller employer with less than ten employees, nevertheless, hired a credit management
company and obtained insurance to cover any loss in sales. Furthermore, this employer
established payment terms that protected the creditor against the possibility of preference
liability. See Telephone Interview with C-N (May 22,2017).
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bankruptcy filing.1 67 As noted by one creditor, "as a customer's
payment pattern slows down and their invoices are aging further
and further and their explanations are weaker and weaker, it
becomes kind of clear, in most instances, what is going on before
they pull the trigger on the bankruptcy." 168 In addition, more
sophisticated creditors are more likely to be aware of preference
law, even if they do not register that any given payment will be a
potential preference until after the bankruptcy filing. 169 On the
other hand, smaller creditors with fewer administrative staff were
much more likely to report being surprised by the bankruptcy, even
167. See Telephone Interview with C (Aug. 28, 2017) ("You tend to learn what happens
when a customer is starting to have problems."); Telephone Interview with C (June 7, 2017)
("Usually, when we start running into payment issues like this and it gets this far this
quickly, then yeah, it's not a big surprise."); Telephone Interview with C (May 18, 2017)
(" [A]nytime anybody files for bankruptcy ... there's always a pattern that we see. Kind of a
payment pattern. It takes them longer to respond. It's more of a payment history pattern that
starts to change."); Telephone Interview with CA (Aug. 8, 2017) (noting that trade creditors
usually see the bankruptcy coming); Telephone Interview with CA (June 6, 2017) ("Oh, you
can tell when a bankruptcy is coming."); Telephone Interview with DA (June 20, 2017)
("Oftentimes, it's not a surprise because more sophisticated trade creditors can see the
warning signs."); Telephone Interview with DA (June 19,2017) ("For my clients who tend to
be sophisticated, it's typically less of a surprise and no longer a traumatic or stigma or issue
associated than it was ... years ago, when I started."); Telephone Interview with PC (July 14,
2017) (" [Wihen someone is filing for bankruptcy we usually get some notice beforehand that
we try to reduce the balance as quickly as possible."); Telephone Interview with PC (July 11,
2017) (" [Wihen you start seeing a company that is rolling out farther and farther and farther
on their payments, and the things that we have in place to monitor accounts, generally it's
not a huge surprise to us when it happens."); Telephone Interview with PC (June 1, 2017)
("Usually, our credit and collections manager is very good at predicting bankruptcies. Very
good. We usually see them coming to be honest.").
168. Telephone Interview with C-VK (June 6, 2017).
169. See Telephone Interview with CA (Aug. 8, 2017) ("The smaller trade creditors
generally didn't see it coming unless they had a lawyer."); Telephone Interview with CA
(June 21, 2017) ("If [creditors are] sophisticated, meaning they've been sued before, then they
go 'oops' when they get the filing.... If they haven't been sued before then sometimes the
demand letter from the debtor or the liquidating trustee is the first they know about it.");
Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017) (indicating that creditors are "not thinking, 'I
have now gotten a preference action' even though they may have a chief financial officer
who certainly knows about preferences"); Telephone Interview with DA (Aug. 31, 2017)
(" [Alny savvy creditor would be sensitive to preferences .... [, b]ut I guess [mom-and-pop
creditors],... they don't have the same sophistication, or they haven't been down that path
before. You go down that path once, you'll never be surprised by it again."); Telephone
Interview with DA (June 20, 2017) ("The sophisticated ones know what's coming, and the
ones that are less sophisticated or haven't been through the process are often surprised by
[preference claims]."); Telephone Interview with DA (May 25, 2017) (observing that
sophisticated creditors "are very well aware of preference actions and the risk that they
might be brought at some point either during or after the case").
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if they had noticed the debtor was behind on its payments.170
Preference actions were especially shocking,171 particularly to
creditors who had engaged in pre-filing negotiation and even
settlement talks with a debtor to resolve the outstanding account.172
The stories given by smaller creditors were telling. One creditor
who headed a firm of less than fifteen employees reported that he
had just established a payment plan with a debtor shortly before
the debtor filed and was shocked, after the bankruptcy filing, to
receive a demand for all of the money he had been paid under the
negotiated payment plan. He observed that "big corporations...
have figured out a way to protect themselves. Small guys like me,
who take you on your word, have no protection."173 Another
creditor with a similarly sized firm reported that the debtor
contacted the creditor in advance of the bankruptcy to assure that
the creditor's debt would be satisfied without the necessity of a
mechanic's lien (which may be exempt from preference
litigation)174 to which the creditor would have been entitled. On
account of the call, the creditor forbore from obtaining the lien only
to receive a notice of the bankruptcy shortly after.175 A third
creditor, with less than ten employees, reported being contacted by
the debtor with an offer to settle for half the debtor's outstanding
balance of $20,000. The creditor accepted the offer "because I didn't
think this company would last," and was astounded to receive a
demand in the debtor's bankruptcy case, not just for the sett -ment
170. See Telephone Interview with C-BC Uuly 14,2017) ("The big guys, you can usually
see [the bankruptcy] coming.... With the smaller guys you wake up one morning and
they're out of business."); Telephone Interview with C-E (May 22, 2017) (expressing surprise
at the bankruptcy despite knowing the debtor was in trouble, but expecting the debtor to
work it out); Telephone Interview with CA (May 18, 2017) ("You've got to be a fairly big, a
fairly good size vendor in order to have a collection department, that can anticipate a
potential bankruptcy, and make changes in their way of doing business to avoid a preference
action."); Telephone Interview with PC (Aug. 31, 2017) (noting surprise about the
bankruptcy, especially since debtor was ordering product until the week prior); Telephone
Interview with PC (June 19, 2017) ("I had no clue that that would ever happen.").
171. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with PC (June 19, 2017).
172. See Telephone Interview with C-R (May 22, 2017).
173. Telephone Interview with PC (May 22,2017).
174. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(6) (2012).
175. Telephone Interview with C-R (May 22, 2017) ("A month later all of a sudden, we
get a letter that we're included in the bankruptcy and now he won't take the owner's
phone calls.").
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amount but for additional amounts received previous to the
settlement.176 "So, they sued for preferential payment. Like I said,
we're the small guy, we're the last one to get paid. So, for us to get
preference payment is ridiculous.... It was so bad. It was
disgusting, you know?" 177 The preference action was settled for less
than half of the preference claim, but the owner maintained, "I still
think it completely unfair." 178 Without a sophisticated under-
standing of the system, these creditors also felt that they were less
successful in challenging or settling preference claims than larger
or better informed creditors. 179 Smaller creditors frequently
reported feeling that they had been disadvantaged by a system of
which they were largely ignorant and that other creditors were left
significantly better off.180 Evidence suggests that these perceptions
were not without basis. 8 1
The final, and perhaps most telling, observation across
interviews was how creditors reacted to the threat of preference
actions. Universally, creditors accepted - and even encouraged -
payments from the debtor, even if they anticipated possible
preference liability would follow. 1 82 Further, they were advised by
176. Telephone Interview with PC (May 20, 2017).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See Telephone Interview with PC (Aug. 31, 2017) ("I would have had to get a
lawyer, go all the way up [to a different state for the hearing] .... [S]o now I'm paying a
lawyer, taking time out of work; by the time I'm done I'm going to lose more than [what]
they owed me. But I think that's what [their goal was.]"); Telephone Interview with PC (June
19,2017) ("They're just wringing everything they can out of you and they want to know your
top dollar and to see how far they could get.").
180. See Telephone Interview with PC (June 19, 2017) ("There were people who were
given preferential treatment and they never got lawsuits against them at all .... Because they
were actually given preferential treatment. We were not one of those people, just for
the record.").
181. See Telephone Interview with DA (July 14, 2017) (noting that the settlement
amount "depends on the facts, of course, and it depends on how savvy the creditor is....
I've seen some creditors will just pay back money without getting into it-they don't want
to deal with the lawsuit."); Telephone Interview with DA (June 23, 2017) ("[T]ypically,
smaller companies will want to negotiate something, say, '(1) we don't want to spend much
money on legal fees; (2) we can't pay you anyway, so let's cut a deal.'").
182. See Telephone Interview with C-BC (July 14, 2017) ("We wouldn't back off on
collection efforts. I might change their terms to COD .. . [and decline when the debtors] want
you to apply it to the past due."); Telephone Interview with PC (July 14, 2017) ("We just try
to get as much cash as we can, as quickly as we can while we know somebody is going
downhill. Or at the very least, our rule of thumb is, let's at least freeze the balance so it doesn't
get any higher."); Telephone Interview with PC (July 11, 2017) (explaining that, if an account
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their attorneys to do exactly that, to "take the money and run[.] It's
always better to have the money in hand than not."183 Literally
every attorney responded to inquiries with similar advice: " [E]very
creditor lawyer that you'll talk to will say 'take the money. We can
always pay it back. Do not refuse money and take the money and
we'll deal with it on the backside under the statute.' ' 184 The shared
perception was that creditors would still be better off taking the
money even with a subsequent preference demand, since the
trustee would invariably settle for a return of some portion-
perhaps half - of the preferential transfer.185
Particularly for more sophisticated clients, this advice might be
followed by the suggestion that a transaction be made as close to
the ordinary course as possible, or otherwise positioned to fall into
is starting to extend, the creditor reduces credit limit and sends representatives over to collect
in person); see also Telephone Interview with CA (June 21, 2017) ("[I]f. . . they see a
bankruptcy coming" they think, "'we better start getting paid on our invoices timely."');
Telephone Interview with DA (June 20, 2017) ("[Slome creditors take the approach of 'I'd
rather have the money and we can fight over it later' and put pressure on to get payment if
they see a bankruptcy coming.").
183. Telephone Interview with CA (May 30, 2017).
184. Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017); see also, e.g., Telephone Interview
with CA (Aug. 8, 2017) (" [I]f you can extract some payments... if you have the negotiating
leverage to get that, get it."); Telephone Interview with CA (July 26, 2017) ("I think the rule
is: take the money and run. Do whatever you can to limit your preference risks, but having
said that .... [tlake the payment and deal with the preference risk another day, which may
be two years from that day."); Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017) ("[I]f they're
going to pay you-take the money. I always tell clients, take the money. You may have
preference exposure, but take the money for now and we'll see what happens."); Telephone
Interview with DA (July 17, 2017) ("It's always wise for the creditor to take a preference....
Because if you can get the money, you can defend it later."); Telephone Interview with DA
(July 14, 2017) ("If your choice is either take the money now or not get money before a case,
you take the money now."); Telephone Interview with DA (June 23, 2017) ("I think
everybody would give the same advice. Take the money. Take the money. Take the money.
Worry about it later."); Telephone Interview with DA (June 19, 2017) ("Always take it....
Always better to take and have to give back than never take it at all."); Telephone Interview
with DA (May 25, 2017) (" [Tihe worst you're going to have to do is give the money back, but
take the money.").
185. See Telephone Interview with C-BC (July 14, 2017) ("Say if you're sued for a ten-
million-dollar preference claim, you.., can settle for a hundred thousand if you have your
ducks in a row."); Telephone Interview with CA (June 6,2017) (" [Y]ou may have to give back
fifty, sixty, seventy cents of it. But you'll get something on it."); Telephone Interview with
CA (June 6, 2017) ("[Y]ou always take a preference.... [Ylou're going to have to give back
part of it. Preferences, in the practical scheme of things, they'll take fifty cents on the dollar
back, sixty cents."); Telephone Interview with DA (June 6, 2017) ("They always settle, and
they always settle for 40 to 60 cents.").
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one of the preference law defenses. 186 Several creditors discussed
the possibility of attempting to convert outstanding amounts owed
as accounts receivable into a new note for repayment in the
ordinary course, or otherwise shielding the old debt with newly
secured debt.187 Structuring payments through a third party, such
as a credit card company, was also discussed as a possible response
to guard against the threat of preference actions.188 Another tactic
used was to enter into an agreement with the debtor that, in
exchange for a reduced settlement of the amount owed, the debtor
would commit to not file bankruptcy for ninety-one days after
receipt of payment.189 Although some of these tactics seemed more
likely to succeed than others, they all represented at least an
awareness and intent to preempt preference liability.
Perhaps the most common response when creditors anticipated
a bankruptcy filing was to simply stop extending credit to the
debtor and proceed on a cash basis going forward. 90 This tended
to be the approach of all creditors interviewed who had recently
experienced preference liability for the first time. Being previously
unaware of such a possibility, they responded going forward by
restricting terms on all their debtors, whether it appeared they
186. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 30, 2017); Telephone Interview with DA
(July 14, 2017) (taking the preference, "you may be able to have ways to arrange for your
payment in a way that doesn't expose you to preference"); Telephone Interview with DA
(June 20, 2017) ("Some will try to manipulate the allocation of the payment, to try and get it
outside of preference wording.").
187. See Telephone Interview with CA (June 6,2017) ("Sure, they're ways to get around
it. I mean, you can advance them new money and take a security interest and incorporate
that debt into the new money."); Telephone Interview with PC (June 1, 2017).
188. See Telephone Interview with CA (July 26, 2017) ("Do they try to move the
payment form from a paper check to a credit card, or change the party paying the past due
invoices? And can we get a third party in the form of a customer's lender to buy the invoices
perhaps at a discount that still take out the problem of the preference risk[?]"); Telephone
Interview with CA (May 18, 2017) (" [Y]ou may even.., see if there's a way to structure
payments from a non-bankruptcy entity, so to speak.").
189. In the event of breach, the full amount of the debt would be reinstated as a claim
against the estate. See Telephone Interview with DA (June 20, 2017).
190. See Telephone Interview with C (Aug. 28,2017) ("[Y]ou can stop shipping them on
terms and make them pay in advance for their orders or not ship them at all."); Telephone
Interview with C (June 7, 2017); Telephone Interview with C-B (July 14,2017) (" [W]e actually
ask for money upfront before we send the merchandise out."); Telephone Interview with PC
(July 14, 2017) ("We usually do it by triing to tighten up the payment plan. In other words,
all credit terms stop."); Telephone Interview with PC (July 11, 2017) (" [I]f they're not paying
they go on cash/check/credit card.").
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would file for bankruptcy or not.191 Creditors might also be quicker
to act on legal rights in future cases to outrun other creditors or
collect before the ninety-day period would run.192 Obviously, these
responses are inconsistent with the stated deterrent intent of
preference law, which was to provide the debtor with greater
breathing space and avoid pressuring the debtor into a bankruptcy
filing. The threat of preference actions does not discourage
creditors from accepting and even encouraging cash payments.
Instead, it encourages creditors to insist on strictly cash moving
forward, and to tighten up lending terms with debtors they believe
are a risk. This constraint on a debtor's liquidity can only contribute
to, not deter, a bankruptcy filing.
VI. PROPOSED ADJUSTMENTS
If the purpose of preference law is to discourage only "unusual"
collection efforts that demonstrate "opt-out behavior,"193 it fails, in
large part because it does not target such behavior. Instead, it casts
a sweeping net that allows savvy creditors to escape its grasp and
leaves less-savvy creditors to take the hit. If the purpose of
preference law were instead to discourage all creditor collection in
the days leading up to bankruptcy by virtue of a shotgun approach,
it still fails, because the risks of being the target of a preference
action combined with the expected penalty associated with
preference liability, do not outweigh the benefits of collection.
It is possible that, despite its failure on such stated goals,
preference law is nevertheless defensible as a deterrent to
191. See Telephone Interview with PC (May 20, 2017) (cut next struggling debtor off
months ahead of the eventual bankruptcy); Telephone Interview with PC (May 22, 2017)
("So, it makes you wonder, as you go for in business, is what it does. It makes you tighten
up all of your financial aid to people, which makes it hard for these other businesses because
you won't extend them as much credit. But you just can't afford to take these risks anymore.
I got most everybody is on a cash basis. You want it, you pay me and you get it .... Nobody's
ever owed me that much money again.... You just lock them into thirty days, and if they
don't you just cut them off. It's just not worth the risk.").
192. See Telephone Interview with C-R (May 22, 2017) ("If we get that sort of a vibe
we're much quicker to go after a mechanic's lien or we've taken several customers to court
to go ahead and get claims against them and judgments before any of this happens.");
Telephone Interview with PC (June 1, 2017) ("We're definitely more aggressive in our
collection efforts.").
193. See Afilalo, supra note 44, at 635; Bussel, supra note 73, at 14.
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bankruptcy itself. If creditors are aware that preference liability
only operates within bankruptcy,194 they may discourage the
debtor from filing in whatever way they can, perhaps by
conditioning negotiations or settlement on the debtor staying out
of bankruptcy. In this way, the law of preferences may operate as a
sort of bankruptcy tax on unsecured creditors.
Alternatively, preference law may operate as a deterrent to
unsecured credit. As described above, fully secured creditors are
immune from preference liability, even though they are the most
able creditors to push a debtor into bankruptcy by threatening or
effectuating collection. Preference law may be viewed as
encouraging more lending arrangements on a secured basis. Of
course, this does nothing to answer the demands of involuntary
creditors, such as tort victims, who typically lack the ability or the
luxury to obtain security. To the extent unsecured credit is not
deterred, preference law may operate to encourage greater
monitoring of debtors, necessitate the retaining of counsel in bank-
ruptcy, and require creditors to take other precautions regarding
unsecured debt.
To be sure, none of these benefits were addressed by Congress
in the passage of preference law, although it is at least theoretically
possible that lawmakers could or would view them as desirable
goals and consistent with an overarching trend in favor of secured
credit to the detriment of unsecured credit. Nevertheless,
preference law is a clumsy tool to accomplish these benefits, as
demonstrated by the weaknesses outlined above, and likely
unnecessary in light of strong state support for secured credit. If
Congress wishes instead to use preference law to avoid the
premature dismantling of companies or raiding of assets by
favored creditors, I would recommend a tailoring and narrowing
of preference law to more carefully target actors with the ability to
harm debtors in this way, and then to increase the penalty
associated with the harmful behavior.
194. See Skeel, supra note 119, at 492-93 (observing the inconsistency in preference law
between state and federal law).
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A. Discrimination Between Creditors
In practice, preference law distinguishes between creditors
based on their value to the debtor and their level of sophistication
about the law, rather than engagement in behavior Congress
thought to be harmful.195 To be effective, laws seeking to deter
creditors from particular behavior must effectively single out
individuals engaged in that behavior and not punish behavior that
was not intended to be targeted. Accordingly, to make preference
law a viable means of deterrence, I would only impose'liability on
those who have the leverage needed to "push" a debtor into
bankruptcy or, in the case of insiders, gut the company during
its slide.
1. Insiders
Even among those predisposed to dislike preference law, there
is a general sense that it is appropriate to reclaim transfers made to
insiders in the days leading up to a debtor's bankruptcy filing.1 9 6 In
some ways, this is a principle of fairness -the insiders are usually
the parties viewed as most capable of preventing a bankruptcy and,
if they have failed to do so, they should pay the consequences for
the failure along with other creditors. Under this view, it is
inherently unfair that insiders should receive payment on their
debts while the debtor has creditors who are left unsatisfied.197
There is also the concern of deterrence against fraudulent
activities. Insiders typically determine which creditor to pay first.
Insiders also typically have the best information regarding financial
distress within a company and may therefore have both the
incentive and the opportunity to bleed a company of its assets
ahead of other creditors. To the extent this activity is fraudulent, it
could be targeted and reversed pursuant to the avoidance of
fraudulent transfers,198 however, fraud may be difficult to prove. In
195. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
196. As defined by the Bankruptcy Code, insiders include relatives or general partners
of the debtor, directors, control persons, and others in similar positions. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(31) (2012).
197. See Telephone Interview with PC (Sept. 14, 2017) ("1 was just the business; I was
just selling product. There was no relationship there; there's no family member,
no nothing.").
198. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
light of this, the return of payments made to insiders during a given
period -preference law places it at one year prior to the
bankruptcy -is likely appropriate. In order to be a deterrent, lia-
bility should exceed the value of the preferential transfer.
The primary concern with allowing increased liability against
insiders is that insiders who have received preferential payments
might hesitate to file for bankruptcy on behalf of their company or
might wait and file at a time that is less likely to expose insiders to
liability, but also less likely to result in a successful reorganization.
Such a disincentive operates under the current bankruptcy law,
although it is unclear the extent to which it affects the decision to
file for bankruptcy.199 However, states impose liability on transfers
made to an insider while the debtor was insolvent pursuant to
prohibitions on fraudulent conveyance. 200 Accordingly, insiders
would have reason to anticipate a demand for transfer in any case.
2. Undersecured creditors
Creditors who have a security interest associated with their
outstanding debt, but who are owed more than the value of their
collateral, are commonly referred to as "undersecured" creditors.
Outside of bankruptcy, the undersecured status has relatively little
significance, other than the fact that the creditor is likely to be left
with a deficiency even after foreclosing on collateral. Within
bankruptcy, however, an undersecured creditor's claim is
bifurcated into a secured and unsecured portion, leading to some
increased complexity regarding the treatment of that claim.
Undersecured creditors retain a claim against their collateral, but
also hold an unsecured claim that will be paid out on a pro rata
basis with other unsecured creditors. Although fully secured
creditors are not subject to preference liability, undersecured
creditors may be if a transfer from the debtor reduces the unsecured
portion of their claim against the bankruptcy estate.
From the perspective of deterrence, any creditor with a security
interest in a debtor's collateral, whether or not the debt is fully
199. See Michelle M. Harner & Janie Marincic Griffin, Facilitating Successful Failures, 66
FLA. L. IEV. 205,223 (2014) (discussing other heuristics and biases influencing management's
decision to file for bankruptcy or not).
200. See Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) § 4(b)(1). This model act has been
enacted in forty-three states.
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018
559 Optimal Deterrence
secured, is more likely to have the leverage necessary to "push" a
debtor into bankruptcy and is therefore a worthier target of laws
that would discourage the creditor from taking steps to foreclose.
Foreclosure-the seizure and sale of debtor property -certainly
constitutes an action outside the ordinary course of business, and
one that is very likely to have a negative impact on the debtor's
ability to function. Further, foreclosure is a value-destroying
process, where collateral may be sold for a small fraction of its true
worth. Accordingly, as far as collection practices go, creditors with
the power to foreclose against a debtor's property should be high
on the list of those Congress would wish to deter, to better
encourage successful reorganizations.
It is perhaps ironic, then, that secured creditors generally are
not subject to the deterrent force of preference law. Foreclosures of
property in full satisfaction of a creditor's debt will be upheld if
they are completed prior to a bankruptcy filing. However, to the
extent a creditor receives payments from the debtor that would
reduce the unsecured portion of a creditor's debt, such payments
should be subject to deterrence through preference liability. An
undersecured creditor is at once secured and unsecured but should
not be permitted to exert the force of its security interest against the
unsecured portion of its debt. Payments to an undersecured
creditor in the run up to bankruptcy are presumably made in
preference to other debts in order to avoid foreclosure.
Undersecured creditors should be deterred from forcing such
payments by relying on their secured status and should therefore
be subject to preference liability if their unsecured debts are
reduced via a transfer from the debtor in the ninety days prior
to bankruptcy.201
3. Tardily secured creditors who use security to coerce or foreclose
A similar analysis applies to creditors who hold outstanding
unsecured debt and then receive a security interest within the
preference period, transforming them from unsecured to secured
creditors at a time when the debtor is presumed to be insolvent. By
201. Creditors who are technically fully secured at the time of bankruptcy on account
of payments made to reduce unsecured debt within the preference period but who otherwise
would have been undersecured should also be subject to preference liability for the
same reasons.
virtue of obtaining a security interest, such creditors have estab-
lished a higher degree of leverage over a debtor, including a more
realistic ability to force the debtor into bankruptcy proceedings. To
the extent preference law is concerned with the exercise of such
leverage it should permit a debtor to strip security interests granted
or perfected in the ninety days before bankruptcy. The reason for
treating perfection as an act of transfer is explained in the different
treatment given to perfected and unperfected liens. Unperfected
liens will not stand up to competing claims, including those raised
by a bankruptcy trustee.2 2 Unperfected security interests, or "secret
liens," should be discouraged to avoid allowing creditors to force
last minute pre-bankruptcy concessions from the debtor. 20 3
Like other secured creditors, even tardily secured (or perfected)
creditors have the power to foreclose against the debtor's property,
which is the leverage needed to force a debtor into liquidation
proceedings or undermine reorganization efforts. However, late-
perfected creditors only obtain this power (presuming insolvency
in the ninety days before bankruptcy) after the debtor becomes
unable to pay his or her debts as they come due. To the extent
Congress wants to discourage actions that torpedo a debtor's
chances for survival during a period of insolvency, the act of obtain-
ing such leverage clearly qualifies.
4. Judgment creditors
The congressional record, with its specific reference to a "rac[e]
to the courthouse," 2 4 appears to signal that judgment creditors
were intended to be targeted and deterred by preference law.
Discouraging judgment creditors from obtaining or executing a
judgment on the eve of bankruptcy can be justified by the pressure
such judgments place on the debtor, especially by locking up
essential collateral. In addition, such judgments can be seen as
202. See discussion supra note 155 (regarding a trustee's strong-arm powers pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 544).
203. See Brave New World supra note 43, at 445, 449 (suggesting that secret liens may be
deliberate, and that the thirty-day rule in § 547(e)(2)(A) "empowers unperfected secured
creditors to get more than they could have under state law and allows them to make pre-
bankruptcy grabs").
204. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 177-78 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138.
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incompatible with principles of judicial economy. Obtaining and
executing on a judgment on the eve of bankruptcy is, in retrospect,
wasted effort because the creation of the bankruptcy estate itself
ensures that all claims will be acknowledged, whether or not they
are reduced to judgment,205 and that the estate will be managed and
liquidated in an orderly fashion, overseen by the bankruptcy court.
Preference law can discourage a creditor from forcing the dupli-
cation of judicial effort by ensuring that a judicial ruling on a claim
against a debtor will provide the creditor no advantage. Rational
creditors will not take on the costs associated with obtaining and
enforcing a judgment if those costs will leave them no better off in
the end.
Recognizing this argument, I am nevertheless troubled by the
fact that preference law's deterrent effect on obtaining judgments
against insolvent debtors runs directly counter to state statutes of
limitations encouraging creditors to exercise their rights against
debtors in a timely fashion. In addition, the application of
preference law to a judicial lien has been specifically objected to by
credit providers, suggesting that many view this provision as
particularly unfair.206 Perhaps the perceived unfairness comes from
the fact that the creditors have rightfully invoked the power of the
state, and would be reasonable in assuming that power to be
paramount; in fact, the judgment lien can be undone by bankruptcy
law. Perhaps the sense of unfairness arises because the creditors
who often take advantage of the courts do so because they have no
other means of leverage or influence over the debtor and may in
fact be tort victims with no other means of collection. It may be that
congressional efforts to discourage a race to the courthouse are
inappropriate when a creditor has no alternative path, but the
legislative history on preference law currently makes no allowance
for such a distinction.
5. Disproportionately large transfers
Finally, preference law should claw back the transfer of a
disproportionate portion of the debtor's assets to satisfy a pre-
existing, unsecured debt, particularly in cases where the debtor is
205. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5), 502(a) (2012).
206. ABI PREFERENCE SURVEY, supra note 53, at 15.
left unable to operate as a consequence. Giving up significant
amounts of the debtor's operating cash is likely to leave the debtor
vulnerable to liquidation and unable to successfully reorganize,
perhaps just as effectively as would foreclosing on essential
collateral. Accordingly, such behavior should be targeted and
deterred.207 The appropriate threshold for how large a cash transfer
must be to invoke liability is likely to be a fact-specific inquiry,
depending on the size of the debtor and the nature of the debtor's
business. For ease of enforcement, the law may incorporate a
standard comparing the size of the transfer to the debtor's overall
liquid assets, or something similar. Such a standard would be more
effective in targeting behavior than simply establishing a minimum
dollar amount.20 8
In establishing liability for these transfers, preference law could
both support and be supported by provisions that allow for the
avoidance of fraudulent conveyances in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy
trustees are permitted to avoid transfers made by the debtor with
"actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" a creditor, or transfers
for which the debtor received "less than a reasonably equivalent
value" in exchange. 20 9 This ability arises both under the Bankruptcy
Code, and by virtue of the trustee's ability to exercise the rights of
any creditor under state law and raise state law causes of action to
avoid fraudulent conveyances, which may have a longer lookback
period.210 However, the burden of proof for fraudulent convey-
ances is much higher than for preferential transfers, 211 and it is often
easier and less time consuming for a trustee to simply bring a
preference action, if the transfer is within the relevant period.
207. It is worth noting that other areas of the Bankruptcy Code deal with a creditor's
exercise of setoff rights, which frequently affect a debtor's operating capital. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 553(b). I would leave these provisions largely untouched.
208. See Bussel, supra note 73, at 12.
209. 11 U.S.C. § 548.
210. Id. § 544.
211. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 547, with § 548. Fraudulent conveyance law typically requires
a finding of intent to hinder, delay, or defraud, which need not be present in
preference actions.
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B. Impose a Deterrent Penalty
Once liability has been limited to the parties listed above, that
is, insiders, partially or recently secured creditors, judgment
creditors, and recipients of a substantial portion of the debtor's
assets in the days leading up to bankruptcy, the law is better able
to justify imposing a true deterrent effect. The justification for
avoiding transfers to these individuals is more concrete, and the
offending behavior more specific. Accordingly, the individuals can
be expected to anticipate, and thereby avoid, a transfer that would
violate the law.212 However, avoidance will only be rational if the
probability of liability combined with the severity of punishment
work together to outweigh the benefit of the targeted behavior.
Under current preference law, creditors remain undeterred because
the costs of liability systematically fall below the benefit of
collection, regardless of how certain liability may be.
To further increase the deterrent effect of the law, I would
therefore recommend attaching a penalty to preference liability
beyond simply returning the original transfer. McCoid has
previously recommended that increasing the sanction to "two or
three times the amount of the preference" would undoubtedly have
a more deterrent effect on creditors subject to liability,213 although
the exact percentage, fine, or additional punishment needed to
effectively deter targeted behavior may be much less than that.
As a caveat, I make this recommendation solely on the basis of
the theoretical framework laid out by Becker, not based on my
findings in the fields. By limiting myself to interviewing trade
creditors, I did not obtain first-hand information as to whether the
individuals I would target for preference liability are currently
deterred, even without an associated penalty. It is conceivably
possible that partially secured creditors are already discouraged
from accepting payments from an insolvent debtor to reduce the
amount of their unsecured debt potential or that secret lien holders,
as a group, do not attempt to perfect a pre-existing security interest
of an insolvent debtor. It may be that judgment creditors are
212. The risk that the law be seen as simply part of a broader Communist plot is
therefore ameliorated. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 30, 2017) (explaining the
difficulty of explaining the preference law to clients).
213. McCoid, supra note 35, at 270.
already discouraged from bringing suit against an insolvent debtor
on the rationale that the effort will be largely wasted as a
consequence of the debtor's immediate bankruptcy filing, even if
they are successful in obtaining a judgment and a subsequent lien.
It would be extraordinarily difficult, as an empirical matter, to
identify any of these individuals, for example, potential judgment
creditors who could have "raced to the courthouse" against a
debtor but opted not to on account of preference law. It is highly
possible that they do exist and that imposition of an additional
penalty on them, and on such creditors as a group, is wholly
unnecessary. Additional empirical evidence may be needed to shed
further light on the subject.
VII. CONCLUSION
I have elsewhere argued that the current legal scheme
undermines the first of preference goals - equality - and here I
have shown how the law, as currently written, is wholly inadequate
to serve the second of preference goals - deterrence. This is true
even assuming (but not conceding) that deterrence of otherwise
legal actions is possible through bankruptcy law, and that deterring
the exercise of rights that disadvantage the debtor is desirable.
In order to be an effective deterrent, the law must first target
those actors and actions it seeks to discourage. Currently, it targets
creditors whether or not they have engaged in behavior worthy of
deterrence, imposing costs and nurturing a sense of unfairness and
resentment towards the system. Further, the law must impose an
actual punishment on targeted creditors if it wishes to deter
behavior that, by virtue of being punishable only in bankruptcy, is
only marginally likely to create a basis for liability. I have here laid
out one proposal for improving preference law's deterrent effect,
although I refrain from passing judgment on whether such
deterrence is actually desirable from a policy perspective. Such a,
question is worthy of additional evaluation.
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